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JUDICIAL NOTICE: FEDERAL RULE 201

JUDICIAL NOTICE:
RULE 201 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The doctrine of Judicial Notice contains the kernel of great possibilities,
as yet not used, for improving trial procedure in the courts of today.... The principle is an instrument of usefulness hitherto unimagined by judges. Let them make liberal use of it; and thus avoid
much of the needless failures of justice that are caused by the artificial
impotence of judicial proceedings.1
Wigmore
Two often cited propositions have influenced extensively the development of the law of evidence. The first is that while questions of law are
determined by the judge, questions of fact are solely within the province
of the jury.2 The second is that inherent in the adversary system is the
duty of the parties to make known the facts.3 In certain situations, however,
the judge will make the necessary factual determination, excusing or pro4
hibiting a party from the burden or privilege of establishing formal proof.
The acceptance by a court of the truth of certain facts without the introduction of evidence is called judicial notice. 5
The doctrine of judicial notice6 has as its foremost goals the promotion
1. 5 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §2583 (2d ed. 1923).
2. C. McCoaICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §328 (2d ed. 1972).
3. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HAxv. L. REv. 269, 273 (1944).
This note deals exclusively with judicial notice of facts; judicial notice of law is
outside its scope. The proposition that a judge is bound to know the common and statutory
law of his own jurisdiction has led to the idea that judges must judicially note the law
of their own forums. In addition, foreign law and the forum's own administrative law
and municipal ordinances have been incorporated into the concept of judicial notice.
The emerging view is that "the manner in which the law is insinuated into the judicial
process is not so much a problem of evidence as it is a concern better handled within
the context of the rules pertaining to procedure." C. MCCORMicK, supra note 2, §328. See
FE. R. Civ. P. 44.1; FED. R. CRlM. P. 26.1. However, some state codes continue to treat
judicial notice of law as an evidence question. See, e.g., PROP. FLA. R. EvD. 90.201-.202;
KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-409 (1964). See generally Keeffe, Landis, & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense
About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REv. 664, 672-88 (1950); Comment, Judicial Notice -Law
of Sister State, 19 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 112 (1967); Comment, judicial Notice -Florida's New
Look at Municipal Ordinances, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 811 (1973).

4. See, e.g., Charles Boldt Co. v. Turner Bros., 199 F. 139, 144 (7th Cir. 1912); Missouri
Util. Co. v. City of California, 14 F. Supp. 613, 614 (W.D. Mo. 1936) ("Judicial notice
supplies facts which otherwise must be proved. .... ).
5. "That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true without
the offering of evidence by the party who should ordinarily have done so." 5 J. WiGMORE,
supra note 1, §2567. See Grand Opera Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 235 F.2d
303, 307 (7th Cir. 1956) ("Judicial notice is merely a substitute for the conventional
method of taking evidence to establish facts.'); In re Malcom, 129 F2d 529, 533 (C.C.P.A.
1942) ("The process of taking judicial notice . . . merely relieves the party from offering
evidence because the matter is one which the judge either knows, or can easily discover.");
Geer v. Birmingham, 88 F. Supp. 189, 228 (N.D. Iowa 1950).
6. The concept of judicial notice is believed to have originated from the medieval
idea that judges were men of great knowledge. Judicial notice was a fiction that "reminded"
the judge of facts he was already presumed to know. Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM.

L. REv. 1 (1922). Bracton expressed the underlying principle in 1222 when he stated that
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of trial expedience and the prevention of flagrant error.7 Judicial notice
operates as a timesaving device by eliminating the need for introduction
of evidence to prove noticed facts." Error is prevented by prohibiting an
adversary from challenging patently indisputable matters.9 In view of the
need to alleviate crowded court calendars and to preserve the integrity of
the judicial system, it is essential that judicial notice be used to its fullest
extent.
Legal writers have consistently advocated an extensive use of judicial
notice.1° Judges, on the other hand, have generally approached the doctrine
with caution." The courts' reluctance to take judicial notice has been
attributed to various factors, including the diversity of facts that may be
noticed,' 2 fear of reversal by an appellate court, 3 indefinite statutes,14 and
a lack of understanding by judges of the concept.' 5 However, the controversy

"ea que manifesta sunt, non indigent provacione" ("that which is obvious need not be
proved"). 2 Bracton's N.B., Case 194 (1222) (marginal notation). This principle was applied
in 1302. Y.B. 30 & 31 Edw. I (RS) 256-59 (1302). The scope of the doctrine was examined
first by Bentham in his nineteenth century treatise on evidence. 6 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM,%
276-78 (J. Bowring ed. 1962). The term "judicial notice" was first employed the following
year. T. STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 400 (2d ed. 1828). See
J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TRIATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 277-79 (1898).
7. McNaughton, Judicial Notice -Excerpts
Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Controversy, 14 VAND. L. REv. 779, 805-06 (1961). See also Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward
a Study of Judicial Notice, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 210 (1967).
8. "The basic objective of a good system of judicial notice should be to achieve the
maximum possible convenience that is consistent with procedural fairness. Proving facts
with evidence takes time and effort. Noticing facts is simpler, easier, and more convenient.
Both the court and the parties benefit from the increased efficiency when a court notices
facts and thereby makes proof of them unnecessary." Davis, Judicial Notice, 1969 L. & Soc.
ORDER 513, 515.
9. "In any system designed to adjust relations between members of a society, the
applicable law ought not to be allowed to vary with the diligence and skill of counsel,
and a decision contrary to what is accepted as indisputable fact in that society cannot
be justified. In an adversary system such as ours . . . it is particularly important that
the court prevent a party from presenting a moot issue or inducing a false result by disputing what in the existing state of society is demonstrably indisputable among reasonable
men." Morgan, supra note 3, at 273.
10. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, §328; J. THAYER, supra note 6, at 309; Keeffe,
Landis, & Shaad, supra note 3, at 665.
11. See, e.g., Makos v. Prince, 64 So. 2d 670, 673 (Fla. 1953) ("The established rule
in respect to judicial notice is that it should be exercised with great caution.') English
v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 426 S.W.2d 33, 41 (Mo. 1968) ("Judicial notice must be exercised
cautiously, and if there is any doubt to the notoriety of such fact, judicial recognition of
it must be declined.").
12. As noted by Wigmore, judges may notice many facts that they cannot be required
to notice by general rules made in advance; furthermore, the doctrine permits notice of
facts in a specific case even though no general rule for the whole class of cases would be
appropriate. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §2583.
13. Keeffe, Landis, & Shaad, supra note 3, at 665-66.
14. Kongsgaard, Judicial Notice and the California Evidence Code, 18 HASTINGS L.J.
117, 118-19 (1966).
15. Keeffe, Landis, & Shaad, supra note 3, at 666.
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that has surrounded judicial notice 6 and the possibilities for abuse' 7 have
probably been the primary considerations behind the courts' hesitancy to
employ the doctrine.
Since judicial notice in the federal courts has until recently been
governed by the common law, the caution with which judges have approached
the doctrine has no doubt impeded expansion of its use. The codification
of the concept of judicial notice in Rule 2011 of the new Federal Rules of
Evidence 19 is therefore important to the development of the law of judicial
notice.
16. Cf. Bush, Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts, 23 FM. INs. COUN. Q. 14, 20 (1973).
17. See Morgan, supra note 3, at 292-93. See, e.g., Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp.,
155 F.2d 808, 811 (10th Cir. 1946) (court judicially noticed that there is not "a streetcar in
the world that is being operated on the thoroughfares of any city that is not equipped with
some warning device.).
18. FED.R. Evw. 201 provides:
"RULE 201
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute
in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court
or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A judge or court may take judicial notice, whether requested
or not.
(d) When mandatory. A judge or court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity
to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter
noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial
notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct

the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed."
19. The Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated pursuant to the power of the

Supreme Court to "prescribe, by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and
the practice and procedure" for criminal and civil proceedings in the federal courts.
18 U.S.C. §§3402, 3771, 3772 (1958); 28 U.S.C. §§2071-2073 (1970). The Rules were formulated

over a period of seven years by a distinguished panel that included judges, law professors,
and practitioners. The Advisory Committee was chaired by Albert Jenner and the Reporter
was Professor Edward Cleary. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 125, 125 n.3 (1973); PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DIsTRIcr COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969);
REVISED DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAisTR.ATEs, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971). The Rules were approved by the Supreme Court on
November 20, 1972, Order, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972), and were to become effective unless vetoed
by Congress within 90 days. However, Congress, in order to evaluate more fully the proposed
rules, enacted legislation to require express congressional approval before the Rules could
become effective. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. The Rules were
finally approved by Congress on January 15, 1975, Act of January 15, 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, and became effective on July 1, 1975. See generally A Discussion
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 F.R.D. 89 (1969); Green, Highlights of the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 GA. L. REv. 1 (1969); Schwartz, The Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence: An Introduction and Critique, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 449 (1969);
Symposium: Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1969 L. & Soc. ORERa 509.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 6

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

Rule 201 should increase the use of judicial notice because it will
alleviate the fears of judges by resolving some of the controversies and by
20
providing procedural safeguards to prevent abuse of the doctrine. For
example, the rule firmly settles the long-standing Morgan-Wigmore dispute
over whether facts judicially noticed must be indisputable and whether
21
evidence in disproof of noticed facts is admissible. The position taken by
23
22
the rule in favor of indisputability and conclusiveness of judicially noticed
facts is supplemented by substantial procedural safeguards to assure fairness
24
to the parties.
Although it solves some problems, new controversies concerning judicial
notice may be generated by some of the rule's provisions, such as the limita25
tion of the rule's scope to adjudicative facts. In a bold departure from
existing judicial practices, the rule distinguishes between adjudicative facts facts concerning the immediate parties2 6 - and legislative facts - facts used
27
by the judge to determine law or policy. Although the reasons for this
distinction are persuasive, the difficulty in distinguishing the two in some
instances may lead to confusion and inconsistency concerning the scope of
the rule. Furthermore, the failure to provide for judicial notice of legislative
facts leaves a significant number of noticed facts outside the rule's
coverage.2 8 The exemption of legislative facts from codification may restrict
the role of judicial notice by discouraging notice of these facts.
This note examines the impact of Rule 201 on the law of judicial notice.
After evaluating the rule's resolution of the Morgan-Wigmore controversy,
it examines the infrequently litigated but important question concerning the
conclusiveness of judicially noticed facts in criminal cases. The note then
explores in detail the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts,
suggesting an approach for distinguishing these facts in unclear cases and
emphasizing the need for codification of judicial notice of legislative facts.
Finally, it briefly surveys judicial notice in the states, noting the probable
impact of Rule 201 on state evidence law.
20. Bush, supra note 16, at 20; Hefflinger, Proposed Rule Broadens Scope of Judicial
Notice, 53 NEB. L. REV. 333, :345-46 (1974).

21. Compare Morgan, supra note 3, at 274, 285 (judicially noticed facts must be indisputable and evidence to the contrary is inadmissible) with 5 J. WIGMORtE, supra note 1,
§2567 (disputable facts may be judicially noticed and disputed by evidence). See text
accompanying notes 37-42 infra.
22.
23.

FED. R. EviD. 201(b).
FED. R. Evm. 201(g).

24. FED. R. EvID. 201(e).
25. FED. R. Evm. 201(a). See Davis, supra note 8, at 525-27. For a unique suggestion on
the codification of judicial notice, see Roberts, Judicial Notice: An Exercise in Exorcism,
19 N.Y.L.F. 745, 758 (1974): "In fact, none of the evidence casebooks used today contain
a single adjudicative fact example that cannot be rationalized just as easily on relevancy
grounds. Bluntly put, the greatest advantage along the lines of codifying evidence would
be by deleting at once even the rump of judicial notice still surviving in the proposed
Federal Rules or in other rules of evidence."
26. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955).
27. Id.
28. Davis, supra note 8, at 525-27. See text accompanying notes 198-202 infra.
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INDISPUTABILITY AND CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDICIALLY NoTIcED FACTS

Two interrelated issues have long remained undecided in the law of
judicial notice. The first area of debate concerns whether facts judicially
noticed must be indisputable.2

9

The second area of disagreement relates to

the admissibility of evidence to disprove judicially noticed facts. In general,
while proponents of the disputable approach favor admissibility of evidence
in disproof,3 0 advocates of the indisputable view argue that judicially noticed
3
facts should be accepted as conclusive. 1
The Federal Rules of Evidence resolved the long-standing controversy
for civil actions in the federal courts in favor of indisputability and
conclusiveness.3 2 Rule 201(b) provides that a judicially noticed fact must be
a fact not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either generally known
in the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.33 Rule 201(g) requires that in civil cases 34 the court instruct
the jury to accept as conclusive any judicially noticed fact.3 5
The Morgan-Wigmore Controversy
The disagreement as to the disputability and the conclusiveness of
29. The terms "disputable" and "indisputable" are used inconsistently throughout
writings on judicial notice. For example, the term "disputable" is used not only to refer to
the nature of a particular fact but also to imply that challenge of the particular fact
will not be permitted. This note employs the term "indisputable" when referring to the
nature of the fact; to say that a fact is indisputable means that its truth or falsity is
beyond question and could not be disputed even if the procedure for challenge were
available.
30. See, e.g., J. THAYER, supra note 6, at 308; 5 J. WirMoRE, supra note 1, §2567; Davis,
A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairnessand Convenience, in PERsPEerzvEs oF LAW 69,
94 (R. Pound ed. 1964).
81. See, e.g., J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE- COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 174 .(1947);
Keeffe, Landis, & Shaad, supra note 3, at 668; McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. REv.
296, 321-22 (1952); McNaughton, supra note 7, at 780; Morgan, The Law of Evidence 19411945, 59 HAv. L. REv. 481, 482-87 (1946).
While the majority of commentators advocate acceptance of the views of either. Morgan
or Wigmore, others have developed their own proposals for the effect of judicial notice.
See, e.g., Comment, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13. VILL. L. REv.
528, 540 (1968) (the scope of judicial notice should vary according to the- function being
performed by the judge when notice is taken). One writer has even suggested that it
makes no difference which view is accepted, that the only difference between the two
views is the time when rebuttal evidence is received. Note, Judicial Notice and Rebutting
Evidence, 56 DiC. L. REv. 464, 466 (1952).
32. The Morgan-Wigmore controversy, however, remains undecided in the states. See,
e.g., Andrews v. Masse,
R.I.
,
, 341 A.2d 30, 33 n.7 (1975) (explicitly refusing
to take a position in the controversy). For a discussion of the states' treatment of the
Morgan-Wigmore controversy, see text accompanying notes 208-210 infra.
33. FED. R. Evm. 201(b).
34. For a discussion of the effect of judicially noticed facts in criminal cases, see text
accompanying notes 70-72 infra.
35. FED. R. Evm. 201(g). This approach is identical to the approach taken by the
Model Code and the Uniform Rules. MODEL CODE EVID. 801, 802, 805; UNiFom RUL.S OF
EVIDENCE 9 [hereinafter cited as UNIF. R. EviD.].
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judicially noticed facts is traditionally stated in terms of the MorganWigmore controversy. 36 The positions taken by the opposing authorities to
this dispute emanate from their views of the purposes of judicial notice.
Wigmore regarded judicial notice as a time-saving device to eliminate
37
the necessity of formal proof in instances in which dispute is unlikely.
Under this approach, both disputable and indisputable facts may properly
be judicially noticed. 38 A judicially noticed fact is not conclusive, but
rather is subject to rebuttal evidence offered by the opponent. 9 Since contrary evidence is permitted, judicial notice under this view operates like a
presumption. As stated by Thayer:
Taking judicial notice does not import that the matter is indisputable.
It is not necessarily anything more than a prima facie recognition
leaving the matter still open to controversy .... In very many cases...
it, i.e., assuming
taking judicial notice of a fact is merely presuming
4°
it until there shall be reason to think otherwise.
In Morgan's theory, the primary role of judicial notice is to "prevent
a party from presenting a moot issue or inducing a false result by disputing
what in the existing state of society is demonstrably indisputable among
reasonable men." 41 Thus, under this approach, only indisputable facts are
proper subjects for judicial notice. Since taking judicial notice is limited
to indisputable matters, "it must follow that no evidence to the contrary is
admissible. "

'42

It is not surprising that representatives of both sides of the MorganWigmore controversy contend that the weight of existing case law supports
their views. Professor Davis stated that the rule's adoption of the Morgan
approach will entail a "drastic change in judicial practices." 43 On the other
hand, the Advisory Committee that promulgated the federal rule, in reference
to the indisputability requirement, spoke of the "tradition . . . of caution

in requiring that the matter be beyond reasonable controversy." 44 With
respect to the admissibility of evidence in disproof of judicially noticed facts,
the Advisory Committee recognized the division among the commentators
but gave no indication that it considered the approach it adopted to be a
36. McNaughton, supra note 7, at 779: "Professor Morgan and Dean Wigmore stand
at opposite poles in the argument over judicial notice."
37. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §2583. As noted by Professor Davis, both Thayer and
Wigmore placed great emphasis on the usefulness of judicial notice. Davis, supra note 8, at
519-20.
38. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945);
Meredith v. Fair, 202 F. Supp. 224, 227 (S.D. Miss. 1962).
39. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §2567. See In re Bowling Green Milling Co., 132 F.2d
279, 283-84 (6th Cir. 1942); Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. United States, 179 Ct. CI. 368, 372
n.2 (1967); Application of Knapp-Monarch Co., 296 F.2d 230, 232 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
40. J.

41.
42.
43.
44.
Comm.

THAYER,

supra note 6, at 308-09.

Morgan, supra note 3, at 273.
Id. at 279.
Davis, supra note 8, at 523.
Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 204 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Adv.
Note].
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dramatic departure from existing case law. 45 Perhaps the most accurate
statement of the positions taken by the courts is that the cases are in "cloudy
confusion."486
Evaluation of the Resolution
The Advisory Committee pointed out three disadvantages of the Wigmore
approach. The Committee first criticized the disputable view because it
places the opponent and the proponent of a judicially noticed fact in
unequal positions. 47 Taking judicial notice relieves a party from the burden
of introducing evidence to prove the fact noticed. 48 If the opponent is
permitted to dispute the noticed fact, the court is faced with two alternatives.
First, it may prevent the proponent from introducing any evidence to
support the noticed fact. This course, however, is unfair to the proponent
because it precludes rebuttal of evidence submitted by the opponent to undermine the noticed fact. If the court alternatively permits the introduction of
evidence to support the noticed fact, the initial taking of judicial notice is
defeated.4 9 Rule 201 solves this dilemma by permitting both parties to argue
the propriety of taking judicial notice before the judge" but prohibits
the parties at trial from offering evidence concerning the noticed fact.
The Wigmore approach was next criticized for defeating the reasons for
judicial notice. 51 The Committee, however, failed to explain its view of the
purposes of judicial notice. As noted earlier, both sides of the controversy
emphasize different purposes of judicial notice. 5 2 Judicial notice, however,
has two equally important functions: the prevention of error and the conservation of time. Both sides guard against flagrant error by permitting
notice of indisputable matters. Each side has traditionally criticized the
other for lack of judicial economy. While the Morgan approach is faulted
45. Id. at 206-07.
46. McNaughton, supra note 7, at 795-96. Compare Seebach v. United States, 262 F.
885, 888 (8th Cir. 1919) with In re Bowling Green Milling Co., 132 F.2d 279, 283-84 (6th
Cir. 1942). For the most part, courts seem to avoid taking a position in the controversy.
See, e.g., TWA v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
409 U.S. 863 (1973) (after setting forth the views of both Morgan and Wigmore, the
court stated that because the present case involved a default judgment, it did "not have
to resolve the debate among the scholars concerning the taking of judicial notice during

trial.).
47. Adv. Comm. Note, at 207.
48. See, e.g., Missouri Util. Co. v. City of California, 14 F. Supp. 613, 614 (W.D. Mo.
1936); In re Malcom, 129 F.2d 529, 533 (C.C.P.A. 1942).
49. "What of the case where a court holds there is no right to offer evidence of facts
judicially noticed, but permits the opponent to dispute the matter? In such a case the
doctrine would not rise even to the dignity of a presumption. Should not the proponent
then also have the right to offer evidence disputing the opponent, and if the court permits
this, what happens to the doctrine of judicial notice?" Keeffe, Landis, & Shaad, supra note
3, at 668.
50. FED. R. Evm. 201(e).
51. Adv. Comm. Note, at 207.
52. Compare 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §2583 (stressing the timesaving aspects ot
judicial notice) with Morgan, supra note 3, at 273 (considering the prevention of flagrant
error as the primary function of judicial notice).
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for the time-consuming requirement of proof for facts that, although not indisputable, are unlikely to be challenged, 53 the Wigmore view is criticized
for wasting time by permitting the opponent to dispute with evidence
judicially noticed facts. 54 It would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine
which approach actually saves more time.
The Committee finally rejected the Wigmore approach because it affects
"the substantive law to an extent and in ways largely unforeseeable.' '5
Although the meaning of this statement is unclear, the Committee was
perhaps referring to the fact that the Wigmore approach permits judicial
notice of disputable facts that are not likely to be challenged. This policy
of the Wigmore approach not only runs counter to the premise that debatable
issues are to be resolved by the jury but also presents the problem of the
effect of judicial notice on a fact that is disputable but uncontroverted.56
The shortcomings of the Morgan approach have been fully articulated
during the course of the controversy by the proponents of Wigmore's view.
The Morgan approach is criticized for prohibiting judicial notice of matters
that, although not indisputable, are unlikely to be challenged.5 7 However,
53. See Davis, supra note 8, at 517.
54. Comment, Judicial Notice and Presumptions Under the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 135, 140 (1969).
55. Adv. Comm. Note, at 207.
56. A further objection to the Wigmore approach is that it entangles the law of
judicial notice with the law of presumptions but fails to provide guidelines as to the
effect of the presumption and as to the burden of rebuttal. Keefe, Landis, & Shaad, supra
note 3, at 668. As noted by Professor Morgan, to enmesh the problems of judicial notice
in the language of presumptions would be "to open another legal Pandora's box." Morgan,
supra note 3, at 286.
However, it has been suggested that presumptions and judicial notice are closely
related because "both are highly debated areas of evidence, and both have the general
effect of saving court time by procedurally giving weight to established truths or probabilities." Comment, supra note 54, at 135. Cf. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 125, 163-164 n.204 (1973) (judicial notice
should not be conclusive in criminal cases; the article advocates the need for provisions
concerning the effect of judicial notice on the sufficiency of the prosecution's case to go
to the jury and for jury instructions; these provisions should be similar to provisions for
presumptions in criminal cases).
57. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 8, at 520, expressed the view that Rule 201 "rejects the
convenient system that courts often use of assuming all facts that are unlikely to
be challenged, taking care to state those that might possibly be erroneously assumed, while
keeping the door open to challenge." It is questionable whether enough facts fall within
this described class to make such a distinction worthwhile, particularly in light of the
caution with which the courts have traditionally approached the doctrine of judicial notice.
In considering objections to the Wigmore approach, it should be emphasized that
Rule 201 applies only to adjudicative facts - those which concern the immediate parties.
The rule does not cover judicial notice of legislative facts, which are used by the judge
to evaluate questions of law or policy. For a detailed discussion of adjudicative and legislative facts, see text accompanying notes 107-172 infra. Two of the three principal proponents
of the Wigmore approach, Thayer and Wigmore, did not have in mind the distinction
between adjudicative and legislative facts. Davis, supra note 8, at 519. Thus, their position
that judicial notice is properly taken of disputable facts and that evidence in disproof
is admissible is perhaps primarily explained by a justifiable desire to prevent a severe limitation of judicial notice of what are now termed legislative facts. Thus, Davis is the
sole major advocate of judicial notice of disputable, adjudicative facts.
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since the doctrine of judicial notice is an exception to the general rule that
questions of fact are solely within the province of the jury,5 8 taking notice of
disputable matters can infringe on the role of the jury at trial. Reconciling
the traditional division between the judge and jury and realizing the timesaving function of judicial notice can best be accomplished by limiting
judicial notice to truly indisputable facts while reserving debatable issues for
the jury.
The Morgan approach is also criticized for defeating the time-saving
function of judicial notice by requiring the judge to ascertain whether a
fact is truly indisputable. 59 Despite this additional requirement, courts adopting
the Morgan theory apparently have not encountered difficulties in applying
the indisputability standard.- In determining indisputability, courts have
generally considered factors such as "the nature of the subject, the issue
involved, and the apparent justice of the case." 61 It is doubtful that federal
courts previously operating under the Wigmore approach will find it difficult
62
to apply similar criteria to the facts at hand.
58. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
59. Comment, supra note 54, at 142 ("indisputable" is a term extremely difficult to
define). See Slovenko, Judicial Notice and Indisputables, 10 CLrv.-MAR. L. REv. 170, 173
(1961) (the legal distinction between disputability and indisputability is scientifically and
philosophically nalv6).
60. See, e.g., Utah Constr. Co. v. Berg, 68 Ariz. 285, 290-92, 205 P.2d 367, 370-71 (1949)
(listing several facts that the court determined were not indisputable); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. Ford, 68 Ariz. 190, 196-97, 203 P.2d 633, 638 (1949) (discussing the meaning of
indisputability).
61. Hunter v. New York, 0 8- W Ry. Co., 116 N.Y. 615, 621, 23 N.E. 9, 10 (1889).
The court in TWA v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
409 U.S. 363 (1973), applied these factors when considering a request for judicial notice
of facts in orders of the CAB and from material in CAB files. In determining that the
facts were not indisputable, the court noted: "Each of these factors counts against noticing
the proposition offered by defendants. First, the subject of the proposition is not scientific,
historical, geographic or statistical matter of the kind courts are most willing to notice.
Instead it is a garden variety proposition about who did what, when, and where. Second,
the facts which defendants wish judicially noticed in this litigation would be relevant to
the central issue of liability under the antitrust laws. The more critical an issue is to a
case, the more reluctant courts should be to determine it by taking judicial notice. Third,
the apparent justice of the case in the posture of a default based upon wilful refusal to
appear for deposition requires me to resolve all doubts against defendants." Id. at 684.
See also Note, Judicial Notice After Default: A Semantical Maze, 37 J. Am L. 109 (1971).
62. Rule 201 does not merely require indisputability. A judicially noticed fact must be
indisputable in that it is generally known in the jurisdiction of the trial court, see Varcoe
v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 346, 181 P. 223, 226 (1919) (what is generally known in one jurisdiction
may not be generally known in another), or capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See United States v.
Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 214 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972)
(judicial notice of statistics in the United States Bureau of Census Reports); Owens-Ill.
Glass Co. v. American Coastal Lines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 923, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (judicial
notice of standard financial book of reference); Colonial Metals Co. v. United States, 494
F.2d 1355, 1360 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (judicial notice of quotations of the price of copper from
trade papers). See also Davis, supra note 8, at 529-30 (focus should be on the degree of
indisputability of the noticed facts rather than on the accuracy of the sources).
The Advisory Committee rejected the previously employed standard of "propositions
of common knowledge" because it believed such propositions inappropriate for judicial
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Proponents of the Wigmore approach also contend that the inadmissibility
of evidence to disprove judicially noticed facts is contrary to views expressed
by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission.6a In that case, the Public Utilities Commission, without
revealing the sources consulted, had taken judicial notice of various facts
outside the record as indicative of market trends. The judicially noticed facts
were used to assess the value of Ohio Bell's property in order to compute the
company's excess earnings for a period of years. The Supreme Court held
that the facts, which indicated a decline in values, were not proper subjects
for judicial notice.64 Moreover, even if the facts had been proper subjects
for judicial notice, the procedure followed by the Commission did not meet
due process requirements because it not only failed to reveal the sources
consulted but also denied the company an opportunity to challenge the
noticed facts. 5 Importantly, the facts at issue were noticed by the Public
Utilities Commission, which served as both judge and jury. Thus, the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the importance of notice and an opportunity
to be heard does not mandate an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence to
a jury; instead, it indicates the Supreme Court's concern that the opponent
be afforded fundamental procedural safeguards when judicial notice is taken.
The need for adequate procedural safeguards is reflected in Rule 201(e),
which permits a party to request an opportunity to be heard on the propriety
of taking judicial notice and on the nature of the matter noticed. Although
no formal notice scheme is contemplated by the rule, 68 the opponent may
receive notice by service with a copy of another party's request for judicial
notice pursuant to subdivision (d). Alternatively, the judge may inform the
opponent of his intention to take judicial notice. If no advance notice is
received, Rule 201(e) permits the opponent to request a hearing after judicial
notice has been taken.
The settlement of the long debated Morgan-Wigmore controversy promotes the achievement of uniformity within the federal court system, which
is one of the primary reasons for codification. Following the views of Morgan,
subdivisions (b), (e), (g) combine to produce an approach to indisputability
and conclusiveness that will successfully avoid the difficulties encountered in
Wigmore's theory. The position taken by the federal rule not only effectuates
the purposes of judicial notice but also upholds the traditional division between the judge and jury.
EFFECT OF JUDICIAL

NOTICE

IN CRIMINAL CASES

As noted above, advocates of the indisputable view generally have argued
notice. Adv. Comm. Note, at 205-06. See also Comment, The Binding Effect of Judicial Notice
Under the Common Knowledge Test, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 208 (1969).
63. 301 U.S. 292 (1937). See Davis supra note 8, at 519.
64. 301 U.S. at 302.
65. Id. See Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (citing
tile proposed federal rule, the court emphasized the importance of giving a party an
opportunity to dispute before judicial notice is taken).
66. Adv. Comm. Note, at 206.
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that judicially noticed facts be accepted as conclusive, while proponents of
the disputable approach have favored admissibility of evidence in disproof.67
Codification of Morgan's indisputable theory may require special considerations concerning the effect of judicial notice in criminal cases.
Rule 201(g) as originally formulated by the Advisory Committee required
the judge to instruct the jury to accept as established any judicially noticed
facts without regard to the nature of the proceeding. 8 This approach is
historically consistent with the development of judicial notice since courts
have failed generally to differentiate between civil and criminal cases.69
In 1974 the House Committee on the Judiciary amended Rule 201 to
distinguish between civil and criminal proceedings. 0 In the Committee's
view, a mandatory jury instruction to accept judicially noticed facts as
established in criminal cases was "contrary to the spirit of the Sixth Amendment."71 The rule now requires the court in criminal cases to instruct the
jury that it may, at its option, accept as conclusive any fact judicially
72
noticed.
At the Trial Level
The approach taken by Rule 201(g) regarding jury instructions in criminal
cases makes a departure from at least some existing judicial theory. Courts
67. See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
68. Order, 56 F.R.D. 183, 201 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Order].
69. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 516 F.2d 1309 (1st Cir. 1975); Jordan v. United
States, 345 F.2d 302 (10th Cir. 1965). See Hefflinger, Proposed Rule Broadens Scope of
Judicial Notice, 53 NEB. L. Rzv. 333, 337 (1974). Furthermore, neither the Model Code nor
the Uniform Rules distinguish between civil and criminal cases. MODEL CODE Evm. 805;
UNIF. R. Evm. 11. The Uniform Rules were amended in 1974, but still do not distinguish
between civil and criminal cases.
70. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2222 (1974).
71. H.R. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7080 (1974).
The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ....
" U.S. CONSr.
amend. VL The taking of judicial notice in criminal cases may violate other provisions of
the sixth amendment besides the right to a jury trial. The sixth amendment also provides
the criminal defendant with the right to be confronted with the witnesses and evidence
against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See People v. Matula, 336 P.2d 1000, 1011, rev'd on
other grounds, 52 Cal. 2d 591, 342 P.2d 252 (1959) (judicial notice in a criminal case
deprived the defendant not only of the right to a trial by jury but also of the right
"to be informed of the evidence against him so that he may counter, question, explain, or
be heard in opposition to it').
72. Fed. R. Evid. 201(g). See generally Farley, Instructions to Juries- Their Role in the
Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194 (1932); Orfield, Judicial Notice in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 31 FoRDSAm L. Rav. 503 (1963); Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the
Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964).
The seventh amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury in civil cases that concern
rights and remedies that were generally known and enforced at common law. US. CONsr.
amend. VII; Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). In civil cases where the seventh
amendment right to a jury trial is involved, debatable questions of fact are to be
determined by the jury. See, e.g., Hunt v. Bradshaw, 251 F.2d 103, 108 (4th Cir. 1958).
See Comment, supra note 31, at 541-42. Thus, a discussion of the role of judicial notice in
criminal cases is also applicable to civil cases concerning debatablef j§q.s .qf fivt.
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often judicially notice facts in criminal cases without reference to the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury. In these cases, the propriety of a jury
instruction to accept judicially noticed facts as conclusive depends on the
court's view of whether noticed facts may be controverted by rebuttal
evidence. Courts accepting Morgan's indisputable position uphold mandatory
jury instructions on the rationale that facts judicially noticed are not
subject to challenge by opposing evidence.73 Any possible conflict with the
sixth amendment is avoided in jurisdictions adopting the Wigmore approach
because evidence contradicting judicially noticed facts is admissible whether
7
the proceeding is civil or criminal. 4
Few courts have directly confronted the question whether a jury instruction to accept facts judicially noticed as conclusive violates the right to a
jury trial in criminal cases.75 Courts addressing the issue have arrived at
opposite conclusions. In State v. Lawrence,76 the defendant was convicted of
grand larceny, which was defined as the taking of property valued in excess
of $50. Evidence was offered at trial to show that the property involved was a
three-year-old automobile in excellent condition. On appeal, the defendant
objected to the trial judge's instruction to the jury that the value of the
automobile was greater than $50. Recognizing the value of the car as being
73. See, e.g., People v. Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 45 P. 860 (1896). In Mayes, the court
considered the propriety of the trial judge's instruction to the jury that, as a matter of
judicial knowledge, the moon rose at 10:57 on the night the crime was committed. On
appeal, the defendant assigned as error the jury instruction and offered affidavits to prove
that the moon rose at 10:35 p.m. The court's finding that the jury instruction was proper
was based on the general principle that facts judicially noticed were not subject to
rebuttal by opposing evidence. Id. at 625, 45 P. at 862.
74. See, e.g., State v. Duranleau, 99 N.H. 30, 104 A.2d 519 (1954). In Duranleau the
defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the
influence of alcohol. The trial judge had taken judicial notice that the road on which the
defendant was driving was a public highway. Although the court found that the nature
of the road was a proper subject for judicial notice, it nevertheless remanded the case to
allow the defendant an opportunity to dispute the noticed fact. Id. at 32, 104 A.2d at 521.
The decision was based on the court's acceptance of the Wigmore approach, which permits
an opposing party to challenge judicially noticed facts. Id. Accord, State v. Miller, 102 N.H.
260, 262, 154 A.2d 699, 701 (1959); State v. Day, 101 N.H. 289, 290-91, 140 A.2d 571, 572
(1958).
Other criminal cases that have upheld the defendant's right to contradict judicially
noticed facts without reference to the sixth amendment include State v. Burley, 523 S.W.2d
575, 579 (Mo. App. 1975) (judicial notice of the fact that a man can walk a mile in 15
minutes did not foreclose rebuttal); Sumpter v. State,
Ind.
,
, 306 N.E.2d 95,
99 (1974) (judicial notice of defendant's sex was not conclusive); State v. Tomanelli, 153
Conn. 365, 368-69, 216 A.2d 625, 628 (1966) (defendant could dispute the judicially
noticed fact that radar was an accurate method of speed determination).
75. Various reasons have been offered to explain the infrequency with which this
issue has arisen. One writer has suggested: "Perhaps this results from the relative insignificance
of the matters which have hitherto been judicially noticed; or because the judges have
exercised their discretion with great restraint; or because many jurisdictions permit dispute
of judicially noticed facts; or because certain jurisdictions which hold that judicially
noticed facts are indisputable nevertheless permit the jury to find to the contrary."
Comment, The Presently Expanding Concept Of Judicial Notice, 13 VILL. L. REV. 528, 546
(1968).
76. 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951).
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a proper subject for judicial notice, the Utah supreme court admitted that
there was no logic to the thought that a jury would find the car to be
worth less than $50. 77 Nevertheless, the court held that jury instruction
on the value of the car violated a state constitutional provision guaranteeing
accused persons the right to a jury trial. 78 The decision was based on the

court's conception of the role of the jury in criminal proceedings.
[U]nder our jury system, it is traditional that in criminal cases juries
can, and sometimes do, make findings which are not based on logic,
nor even common sense. No matter how positive the evidence of a
man's guilt may be, the jury may find him not guilty and no court
has any power to do anything about it.79
The Lawrence court found the invasion of the jury's province particularly
troublesome because the fact noticed constituted an essential element of the
offense charged. 0
A contrary result was reached in Gold v. United States,81 in which the
defendant was convicted for knowingly using an interstate carrier to transport an obscene film. At trial, judicial notice was taken of the fact that
United Airlines was a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, and
the jury was instructed to accept the noticed fact as conclusive. Although
the trial judge had previously informed the parties of his intention to take
judicial notice, the defendant had not offered to dispute the fact that the
airline company was engaged in interstate commerce. On appeal, the defendant contended that a court could not take judicial notice of a fact
constituting an element of the crime charged. In holding that the jury
instruction was proper, the Gold court was primarily influenced by two
factors: the indisputability of the noticed fact and the provision of adequate

77. Id. at 330, 234 P.2d at 603. It should be noted that Utah is a jurisdiction that
follows the Wigmore view that matters may be judicially noticed if they are not likely
to be disputed and that an opposing party may offer contradictory evidence. Id. at 328-29,
234 P.2d at 602. However, this court apparently considers the fact noticed to be indisputable.
Therefore its discussion of constitutional principles is relevant to the indisputable approach
adopted by the Federal Rules.
78. Id. at 331, 234 P.2d at 603. The judgment of the lower court was reversed, and the
case was remanded for a new trial at which the state would be permitted to submit evidence
of the value of the automobile. The court found that the "reversal of a conviction at the
instance of the defendant, and subsequent remand of the case for a new trial does not
constitute" placing "the defendant twice in jeopardy to entitle him to go free." Id. at 332,
234 P.2d at 604. But see United States v. Blattel, 340 F. Supp. 1140, 1143 (N.M. Iowa
1972) (government failed to prove two elements of the offense charged and defendant was
acquitted).
79. 120 Utah at 330, 234 P.2d at 603. See State v. Taylor, 132 N.J. Super. 386, 392,
333 A.2d 592, 595 (1974) (in a non-jury criminal larceny case, the trial court properly took
judicial notice of the indisputable fact that the property involved was of some value).
80. "If a court can take one important element of an offense from the jury and determine
the facts for them because such fact seems plain enough to him, then which element cannot
be similarly taken away, and where would the process stop?" 120 Utah at 330-31, 234 P.2d
at 603.
81. 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967).
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procedural safeguards s 2 Based on these considerations, the court concluded
that a reversal would be "formalistic and useless."' 's The Gold court's conception of the jury's role in criminal cases was narrower than that of the
Lawrence court.
The defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right that the
jury, regardless of the evidence against him, may acquit him. But he
does not have the right that a jury should be free, in its deliberations,
to decide that the earth is flat.s4
The Gold court agreed with the Lawrence court's conclusion that juries are
entitled to find contrary to logic or common sense. It differed from the
Lawrence court, however, in determining that the right to trial by jury
does not extend to indisputable matters. Although the jury could determine
that the defendant was not guilty of knowingly using an interstate carrier to
transport an obscene film, it was not free to find that United Airlines was
not a carrier engaged in interstate commerce.
The Gold approach is consistent with the sixth amendment right to a
jury trial. s 5 Since judicially noticed facts take the place of evidence, the
taking of judicial notice in Gold merely excused the state from having to
submit proof that United Airlines was a carrier in interstate commerce. The
Gold court explicitly upheld the defendant's right to a jury acquittal regardless
of the evidence against him. In addition, the instruction to the jury to
accept the noticed fact as established does not restrict the jury in its exercise
of jury nullification. Under this doctrine, a jury can set aside instructions
of the judge and reach a verdict of acquittal based on its own consciences6
82. Id. The importance of procedural safeguards in a criminal case was emphasized
in United States v. Blattel, 340 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Iowa 1972), in which the court refused
to take judicial notice on a motion for acquittal. Gold was distinguished because "[t]here
the defendant had an opportunity to present information which might bear on the propriety
of noticing the fact, or upon the truth of the matter to be noticed." Id. at 1142. Other
cases that stress the importance of procedural safeguards before judicial notice is taken
in a criminal case include: Fringer v. Venema, 26 Wis. 2d 366, 132 N.W.2d 565, 569-70
(1965): People v. Matula, 336 P.2d 1000, 1013, rev'd on other grounds, 52 Cal. 2d 591, 342
P.2d 252 (1959).
83. 378 F.2d at 590.
84. ld.
85. See United States v. Alvarado, 519 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1975). In Alvarado the
defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana. On
appeal, the defendant objected to the district court's judicial notice of the location and
other physical aspects of the checkpoint where the defendant had been arrested. Citing
Federal Rule 201, the Alvarado court stated: "Clearly the trial judge was warranted in
taking judicial notice of immutable geographic and physical facts . . . . This facility
of accepting what was plainly true could not abridge any Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses." Id. at 1135. See also State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 336, 234 P.2d 600,
606 (1951) (Wolfe, C.J., dissenting) ("There is no constitutional provision which prohibits
the trial judge from taking judicial notice in a criminal case of a fact, sufficiently notorious.").
But see Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO.
L.J. 125, 163-65 (1973) (approving the distinction between civil and criminal cases).
86. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REY. 168, 168 (1972).
The doctrine of jury nullification is considered by some commentators to be essential
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Thus, the jury in Gold was free to disregard any instruction and acquit the
defendant if it believed that the criminal statute was unjust or felt that
8
the statute should not be applied to the particular defendant 7
In determining the propriety of instructing the jury to accept judicially
noticed facts as conclusive in criminal trials, adherence to constitutional
principles is, of course, the overriding consideration. Since the Gold instruction does not violate the right to trial by jury, this approach is further
justified by its consistency with the basic purposes of judicial notice. One reason
for judicial notice in an adversary system is to prevent parties from inducing
false results by contradicting indisputable matters.18 Juries should similarly
be restrained from reaching flagrantly ei-roneous results. This is particularly
true in cases like Gold, in which the defendant did not attempt to
contradict the judicially noticed fact. To permit a jury to find contrary to
an indisputable fact is to invite a loss of public confidence in the criminal
justice system.8 9 Furthermore, the Gold approach promotes trial convenience
and expedience by obviating the need for formal proof of necessary elements
of a crime when such elements are appropriate subjects for judicial notice.
Rule 201 requires consideration of the two factors influencing the decision
in Gold: indisputability and notice to the parties. Subdivision (b) requires
facts judicially noticed to be indisputable. The possibility of a court's noticing
a disputable fact is substantially lessened by the procedural safeguards
mandated by subdivision (e). A criminal defendant is entitled to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice. If, after
hearing the defendant's opposing views, the judge determines that a fact
is subject to reasonable dispute, judicial notice will not be taken and both
parties will be permitted to present evidence to the jury. On the other
hand, if the matter is truly indisputable, the judge may instruct the jury
to accept it as conclusive without any infringement on the defendant's
right to a jury trial.o
Since the jury instruction now required by Rule 201(g) is not constitutionally mandated, the position expressed in the rule should be rejected in
favor of an approach that better accomplishes the purposes of judicial notice.
to maintaining the legitimacy of the judicial system. Id. at 183. See generally Comment,
Jury Nullification and the Pro Se Defense: The Impact of Dougherty v. United States,
21 U. KAN. L. REv. 47 (1972); Note, Jury Nullification: The Forgotten Right, 7 N. ENG. L.
REv. 105 (1971).
87. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969).
88. Morgan, supra note 3, at 269, 273.

89. For a comparison of judicial notice and judges' comment on the evidence and
a suggestion that both "serve . . . to maintain [the] . . . prestige for justice," see State
v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 336-37, 234 P.2d 600, 606 (1951) (Wolfe, C.J., dissenting).
90. "Obviously, it would be wastefully time-consuming, as well as unnecessary to the
protection of the right to jury trial, for a court to notify the parties that it has judicially
noticed, or is going to notice,. a truly indisputable fact. This is particularly true if the
fact is not specifically at issue." Comment, supra note 75, at 543-44. The Advisory Committee
was in agreement when it discussed Rule 201(g) as originally formulated without regard to
the nature of the proceeding: "Proceeding upon the theory that the right of jury trial
does not extend to matters which are beyond reasonable dispute, the rule does not distinguish between criminal and civil cases." Adv. Comm. Note, at 207.
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Subdivision (g) should be amended to require the judge to instruct the jury
to accept as established any judicially noticed facts without differentiation
between civil and criminal trials.9
At the Appellate Level
In a criminal prosecution, the government is charged with the burden of
proving each material element of the offense charged. 92 At trial, when facts
relating to essential elements of the offense are indisputable, it is immaterial
whether they are presented to the jury by formal proof or by judicial
notice. At the appellate level,93 however, judicial notice of such facts may
violate a criminal defendant's right to have each element of the crime
considered by the jury.
In People v. Matula,9 4 the defendant was convicted of perjury for giving
false testimony before art investigative committee. The court determined
that although materiality was a question of law, facts relating to the element
of materiality were within the province of the jury. 9s Since facts relating to

91. Rule 201 applies only to indisputable adjudicative facts that concern the immediate
parties. Since legislative facts are beyond the scope of the rule, judicial notice may properly
be taken of disputable legislaiive facts. While adjudicative facts are predominantly facts
appropriately considered by a jury, legislative facts are usually employed by the court
to determine questions of law, which are to be decided by the judge alone. "Nevertheless...
when ultimate disposition of a case is dependent upon legislative facts, the right to trial
by jury may effectively be denied unless the jury is permitted to determine the truth
and authenticity of those legislative facts, particularly when the facts in question are
subject to a great deal of dispute. In such cases, it is arguable that until the jury
determines the truth of the facts, the court should not utilize the facts to make new
law." Comment, supra note 75, at 544-45. For an example of judicial notice of a legislative
fact in a criminal case, see Jordan v. United States, 345 F.2d 302, 304 (10th Cir. 1965)
(judicial notice taken that heroin was a derivative of opium and therefore a narcotic within
the meaning of a statute).
92. Gordon v. State, 86 Fla. 255, 256, 97 So. 428, 429 (1923). See F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL
EvIDENCE §16 (12th ed. 1955).
93. A discussion concerning the constitutional limitations on judicial notice at the
appellate level in criminal trials also relates to judicial notice on a motion to acquit. For
example, in United States v. Blattel, 340 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Iowa 1972), the defendant was
convicted by a jury of wiretapping. The defendant moved for acquittal based on the fact
that the government had failed to offer evidence at trial to prove two essential elements
of the offense. The court denied the government's request that facts proving the two
elements be judicially noticed, noting that the request would have been appropriate at
trial but was not cognizable on appeal. "Because of plaintiff's belated request, the court
is of the view that to take judicial notice of the requested facts . . . would be unfair,
even though they may be true." Id. at 1142. A state court reached a similar result in
State v. Main, 94 R.I. 338, 314, 180 A.2d 814, 817 (1962), in which it was held that a
trial judge, in considering a motion to direct a verdict of acquittal, may not resort to
judicial notice "to establish the existence of material facts which could not be found by a
jury on the evidence contained in the record." The dissenting justice in Main argued that
facts of common knowledge could be judicially noticed on a motion for acquittal because
such facts could have been used by the jury to reach its verdict. Id. at 349, 180 A.2d at
820.
94. 336 P.2d 1000, 1014, rev'd on other grounds, 52 Cal, 2d 591, 342 P.2d 252 (1959).
95. Id. at 1010.
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the materiality of the defendant's testimony before the committee had not
been submitted to the jury, the case was reversed and a new trial granted. 96
Next, the court considered a request by the prosecution that the committee
proceedings be judicially noticed to prove materiality. In denying the request,
the court did not consider whether the facts were indisputable, nor did it
consider whether an opportunity to dispute the facts at the appellate level
would satisfy the procedural safeguards needed before judicial notice is
taken at the trial level. Rather, the Matula court expressed the view that taking
of judicial notice at the appellate level "runs counter to the constitutional
rights of [a] defendant to have the facts relating to an essential element of
the crime passed on by a jury .. .
In contrast to the approach taken by the California court in Matula,
federal appellate courts have judicially noticed facts without reference to
the right to a jury trial. 98 In United States v. Mauro,99 the defendant appealed
a conviction of conspiracy to possess and dispose of the property of a national
bank. Although at trial the government had proved the defendant's possession
of cashiers' checks of the First National City Bank, it had offered no evidence
to show that the First National City Bank was a national bank. The Mauro
court unhesitatingly took judicial notice that the bank was a national bank 00
without considering any constitutional limitations. In Ross v. United
States, 10' the court was called on to determine whether the evidence sustained
the jury's verdict of obstructing the mails. In upholding the defendant's
conviction, the court judicially noticed that social security checks are mailed
out with written instructions to return them to the sender if the addressee
0 2
is deceased.1
Both the Maruo and Ross courts applied a practical approach to judicial
notice at the appellate level. While in Mauro judicial notice was taken of an
96. The Matula court's decision to grant a new trial was subsequently reversed by
the California supreme court, People v. Matula, 52 Cal. 2d 591, 342 P.2d 252 (1959). Although
the supreme court agreed with the district that factual questions were to be determined
by a jury, it nevertheless deemed a new trial unnecessary because the challenged jury
instruction was not prejudicial. Id. at 596, 842 P.2d at 256. The jury instruction was not
prejudicial error because there was "no reasonable probability that the jury would have
reached a different verdict had the materiality instruction required them to find first
that the transcript accurately reflected the committee proceedings." Id. at 600, 342 P.2d
at 257-58. However, this reversal is poor precedent today because the determination of no
prejudicial error was based on the standard employed in nonconstitutional cases rather
than on the much stricter standard for constitutional cases, which requires that the
error be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
See notes 105, 106 infra.
97. 36 P.2d at 1014.
98. See Hefflinger, supra note 69, at 338.
99. 501 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1974).
100. Id. at 49. Compare Byers v. United States, 175 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir. 1949)
(court took judicial notice of the fact that a bank with the word "national" in its title
is one organized under the laws of the United States) with King v. United States, 426 F.2d
278, 279 (9th Cir. 1970) (court refused to judicially notice that a branch of the Bank
of America was a national bank).
101. 374 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1967).
102. Id. at 103.
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essential element of the offense charged, in Ross the court judicially noticed
a fact to aid its decision as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
jury's verdict. Apparently, neither court deemed a remand for a jury's consideration necessary for a fair trial. Indeed, the facts noticed in both cases
were indisputable facts that would have been appropriate for notice at the
trial level under both Morgan's and Wigmore's theories.
Rule 201(f) codifies the generally accepted notion that judicial notice
may be taken at any stage of the proceeding, whether in the trial court or
on appeal.1 0 3 The approach taken by the Mauro and Ross courts is consistent
with this subdivision. The fact remains, however, that the government in a
criminal prosecution must prove each element of the offense charged. As
demonstrated by Matula, judicial notice of an essential element of a crime
at the appellate level may deprive a criminal defendant of the right to
jury trial.o4 To avoid this problem, Rule 201(f) should be amended to
provide that in criminal cases an appellate court may take judicial notice
of facts relating to elements of the offense charged only if the government's
failure to prove such facts at trial constituted harmless error. 0 5
Under the harmless error doctrine, even a constitutional error does not
require reversal if the appellate court determines that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.10° In cases like Mauro and Ross, where failure to
prove the elements at trial was clearly harmless error, judicial notice at the
appellate level would prevent the waste of judicial resources and time required
by an unnecessary reversal.
ADJUDICATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE FACTS

The concept of categorizing judicially noticed facts as adjudicative or

103. See, e.g., Hunter v. New York, 0 & W Ry. Co., 116 N.Y. 615, 23 N.E. 9 (1889).
See Keeffe, Landis, & Shaad, supra note 3, at 671 (appellate courts frequently employ the
doctrine of judicial notice). It is usually said to be within the court's discretion whether
notice is appropriate at the appellate level. See, e.g., Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. United
States, 179 Ct. Cl. 368, 373 n.2 (1967) (matters should not be judicially noticed at the
appellate level where they would raise controversies not presented by the trial record).
104. The Matula court cautioned that although "a departure from established recognized

legal procedure may appear in an individual case to adequately serve the ends of justice,
judicial approval of such a practice could only constitute a dangerous inroad into an
orderly system of justice which protects the constitutional rights of the accused." 336 P.2d
at 1014.
105. Under the harmless error doctrine, a conviction will not be reversed for errors
or defects that did not affect the substantial rights of the parties. The purpose of the
doctrine is "to preserve appellate review as a check on arbitrary action or essential unfairness
but at the same time to make the judicial process perform its function without permitting
loopholes to exist for the benefit of men who have been fairly convicted." HERRICK,
UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCt §3 (6th ed. 1973).

106. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The standard for determining the
presence of harmless constitutional error is a very strict one, requiring that the error
be proved harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The test for nonconstitutional error
is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error or defect might have contributed
to the conviction. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87
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legislative was introduced by Professor Davis in 1942.107 Although the idea
of classifying judicially noticed facts has been widely accepted by legal
writers, 10 the concept has previously received little judicial recognition. 09
Federal Rule 201, however, adopts the distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts. The rule's application is expressly limited by subdivision (a)
to adjudicative facts. 1 0 Legislative facts are not mentioned in the rule, and
the Advisory Committee's Note on subdivision (a) makes it clear that they
are excluded from the rule's scope."' Thus, the common law approach developed by the federal courts will continue to govern judicial notice of
legislative facts.
Definitions
A starting point for analyzing the nature of a particular fact is Professor
Davis' functional definitions of adjudicative and legislative facts. The Advisory
Committee adopted the following statement on adjudicative facts:
When a court or agency finds facts concerning the immediate parties who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent - the

court or agency is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts

are conveniently called adjudicative facts. . . . Stated in other terms,
the adjudicative facts are those to which the law is applied in the
process of adjudication. They are facts that normally go to the jury

to the parties, their activities, their properin a jury case. They relate
2
ties, their businesses."1

107. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARv. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942).
108. See, e.g., C. McCoRMicK, supra note 2, §328; McNaughton, supra note 7, at 787-88;
Comment, supra note 75, at 533. See also 2 K. DAvis, ADMINTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §15.03
(1958); Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairnessand Convenience in PERSPECTIvEs
oF LAw 69 (R. Pound ed. 1964).
109. Some courts, however, have recognized the distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts. See, e.g., Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1248 (Ist Cir. 1970); Hunt Oil
Co. v. FPC, 424 F.2d 982, 985 (5th Cir. 1970); Marine Space Enclosures v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 420 F.2d 577, 589-90 (D.C. Cir. 1969); American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624,
633 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). See K. DAVIs, ADMIsa RTWVE LAw TExr
§7.05 (3d ed. 1972).
110. FED. R. EvD. 210(a).
111. Adv. Comm. Note, at 202.
112. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 945, 952 (1955). For example, in Tasby
v. Peek, 396 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Ark. 1975), a client brought an action against his former
court appointed attorney for damages allegedly arising out of a defense to a kidnapping
charge employed by the attorney. The court dismissed the complaint because the action
was barred by a three-year statute of limitations. After stating that the complaint was fied
on June 3, 1974, the court took judicial notice that the verdict finding the plaintiff
guilty of kidnapping was entered on March 27, 1970, more than three years before the
complaint was filed. The court further judicially noticed that the defendant's services for
the plaintiff terminated on October 12, 1970, when another attorney was appointed to
represent the plaintiff. Id. at 955. The facts noticed by the, Tasby court were adjudicative
because they concerned the immediate parties and answered the questions "who did what"
and "when."
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Legislative facts are defined as follows:
When a court or agency develops law or policy, it is acting legislatively;
the courts have developed the common law through judicial legislation,
and the facts which inform the tribunal's legislative judgment are
called legislative facts. . . . Legislative facts are those which help
the tribunal to determine the content of law and policy and to exercise
its judgment or discretion in determining what course of action to take.
Legislative facts are ordinarily general and do not concern the immediate parties.113

These definitions emphasize two related considerations- the function performed by the court and the relationship of the facts noticed to the immediate
parties.
An understanding of the distinction between adjudicative and legislative
facts clarifies the close interrelationships between the various subdivisions of
Rule 201. Limiting the scope of the rule to adjudicative facts does not
diminish the significance of the resolution of the Morgan-Wigmore controversy
for federal court actions because the controversy has implicitly centered on
judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 114 Since they relate to the immediate
parties, adjudicative facts may or may not be indisputable. In contrast, legislative facts are often disputable because their determination is frequently
based on sociological, economic, moral, and political data that are subject
113. Davis, supra note 112, at 952. "Judicial notice of [legislative] facts occurs when a
judge is faced with the task of creating law, by deciding upon the constitutional validity of
a statute, or the interpretation or restriction of a common law rule, upon grounds of
policy, and the policy is thought to hinge upon social, economic, political or scientific facts."
C. McCORMICK, supra note 2, §328.
For example, in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), the plaintiff, a divorced widow
seeking support payments accruing after her daughter reached 18, challenged the constitutionality of a Utah statute extending the period of minority for males to age 21 and
for females to age 18. Defending the sex-based classification, the state of Utah stressed
the importance of education for males since it enabled them to fulfill their primary
responsibility to provide a home. Females were distinguished because they mature and
marry earlier. Holding the statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court determined that
parental support for the attainment of education was as important for females as for
males. Id. at 14-16. In reaching this conclusion the Court judicially noticed "the presence
of women in business, in the professions, in government and in all walks of life where
education is a desirable . . . antecedent." Id. at 15. The fact noticed was not adjudicative
because it had no particular significance to the immediate parties. In making this general
observation about current social conditions, the Court was performing a legislative function,
i.e., it was considering factors relevant to the formulation of a statute setting the age of
majority. The fact was legislative because it aided the Court in exercising its judgment as to
whether the state's justification constituted a rational basis for the discrimination. See
Leflar, Sources of Judge-Made Law, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 323, 325 (1971): "It used to be
fashionable for judges to say that they never 'made' law, but only 'found' pre-existent
law and applied it to new facts. Few appellate judges talk that way today . . .. It
would be easy to cite . . . hundreds of areas in which our common law courts, as the
interests and needs of society changed, have moved the law away from old positions
to newer ones that better fit society's new interests and needs."
114. Even Professor Morgan, the most persuasive advocate of the indisputable approach,
recognized the importance of allowing the judge freedom of investigation when he is
determining the content or applicability of the law. Morgan, supra note 3, at 270.
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to various interpretations. 115 Thus, applying the indisputability standard of
subdivision (b) to legislative facts would essentially prevent their judicial
notice. 16 By confining the scope of Rule 201 to adjudicative facts, the Committee was able to adopt the more popular indisputable approach without
restricting the usefulness of judicial notice of legislative facts to determine
law and policy."17
The requirement of subdivision (g) that the judge in civil cases instruct
the jury to accept judicially noticed facts as conclusive is a corollary to the
indisputability standard established by subdivision (b)." 8 The jury instruction
is required because adjudicative facts relating to the immediate parties are
the types of facts that normally go to the jury in a jury case. Even in
criminal cases, a provision for a jury instruction as to the effect of legislative
facts would be unnecessary because the determination of facts used by the
judge in his reasoning process are not within the jury's province.
DistinguishingBetween Adjudicative and Legislative Facts
Since the scope of Rule 201 is limited to adjudicative facts, its application
changes traditional judicial practice by necessitating a threshold determination of whether the fact to be noticed is adjudicative or legislative." 9 While
some facts are readily classified as adjudicative or legislative, the distinction
is not always a simple one.120 The court confronted with the problem of distinguishing the two may find it helpful to consider the reasons underlying
the distinction.
The purposes of distinguishing between adjudicative and legislative facts
are related to the function performed by the court and the relationship of
the facts noticed to the immediate parties. Thus, the basic distinction betweenadjudicative and legislative facts involves two important considerations fairness to the parties and flexibility for the judge in the reasoning process.' 2 '

115. C. McCoamcK, supra note 2, §331. See generally Kohn, Social Psychological Data,
Legislative Fact, and Constitutional Law, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 136 (1960).
116. Adv. Comm. Note, at 203.
117. The importance of judicial notice of legislative facts to the development of the
common law cannot be overemphasized. "[fludge-made law would stop growing if judges,
in thinking about questions of law and policy were forbidden to take into account the
facts they believe, as distinguished from facts which are 'clearly . . . within the domain
of the indisputable.' Facts most needed in thinking about different problems of law and
policy have a way of being outside the domain of the clearly indisputable." Davis, supra
note 30, at 82.
118. Cf. Comment, Judicial Notice in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1969
WAsH. U.L.Q. 453, 457.
119. Id. at 456.
120. Cf. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
62 GEO. L.J. 125, 161 (1973) ("Although the distinction between these tfvo types of fact
may often be elusive, the basic difference is illustrated easily.").
121. "The ultimate principle is that extra-record facts should be assumed whenever
it is convenient to assume them, except that convenience should always yield to the rethe appropriate
quirement of procedural fairness that parties have an opportunity to meet in.
fashion all facts that influence the disposition of the case." Davis, supra note 8, at 515.
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If adjudicative facts are at issue, the paramount consideration is the
relationship of the noticed fact to the parties. Facts relating to the immediate
parties should not be determined without affording the parties an opportunity
to know and to dispute what may be unfavorable to them. 122 Rule 201
recognizes the importance of party input into judicial notice of adjudicative
facts not only by requiring that such facts be indisputable but also by
providing various procedural safeguards before notice is taken of adjudicative
facts. Where adjudicative facts are concerned, considerations of fairness to
the parties outweigh the expedient resolution of the issues made possible by
the court's assumption of disputable adjudicative facts.
On the other hand, when performing a legislative function such as
determining questions of law and policy, the judge should be unrestricted in
his investigation and conclusion.123 For this reason, findings of adjudicative
facts must be supported by evidence, but findings of legislative facts need
not, and sometimes cannot, be supported by evidence.124 "In conducting a
process of judicial reasoning . . . not a step can be taken without assuming

something which has not been proved; and the capacity to do this with
competent judgment and efficiency is imputed to judges . . . as part of
their necessary mental outfit."'1 25 Judicial notice of legislative facts is often

nothing more than a formalized treatment of the assumptions used in the
judicial reasoning process.126 While the parties may assist the judge in finding
legislative facts, the judge is free to reject data presented by the parties and
to make an independent investigation.127 If legislative facts are at issue, fair122. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1937). The
purpose behind this requirement is "that the parties know more about the facts concerning
themselves and their activities than anyone else is likely to know, and the parties are
therefore in an especially god position to rebut or explain evidence that bears upon
adjudicative facts." K. DAvis, supra note 109, §7.03.
123. Morgan, supra note 3, at 270. See B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PRocEss 113-14 (1921).
124. K. DAvis, supra note 109, §15.03. In the 1965 term, the Supreme Court went
outside the record in almost one-half of its cases. The use of secondary sources was
particularly pronounced in constitutional cases. Most of the secondary sources were cited
as authority for legislative facts rather than for facts concerning the particular controversy
at issue. The most frequently cited secondary sources were law review articles and legal
treatises. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material: 1965 Term, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 55, 80 (1968).
125. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 279-80
(1898). The fine line between formal notice of a legislative fact and the general process
of legal reasoning is also found in jury determinations. The elementary processes of understanding and reasoning, the beliefs, assumptions, and preconceptions that a juror brings
to the trial are usually not expressed in any formal way. This similarly "elusive" process
is referred to as "jury notice." McNaughton, supra note 7, at 789-90.
126. "Whereabout in the law does the doctrine of judicial notice belong? Wherever the
process of reasoning has a place, and that is everywhere. Not peculiarly in the law of
evidence . . . . The subject of judicial notice, then, belongs to the general topic of legal
or Legitimate Business Practice?, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 232, 233 (1963).
127. "In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domestic law, the judge
is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He may reject the propositions of either
party or of both parties. He may consult the sources of pertinent data to which they
refer, or he may refuse to do so. He may make an independent search for persuasive
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ness to the parties, who have no particularized knowledge to contribute, may
properly be considered secondary to the judge's need for flexibility in the
reasoning process.
Davis and Cleary: A Case Study of the Difficulty of Distinguishing
Adjudicative and LegislativeFacts
Although some facts are easily classified as adjudicative or legislative,
the distinction is not always made without difficulty. Rule 201(a) will require
the development of a body of interpretive case law before the distinction
between adjudicative and legislative facts emerges as a clearly defined concept. 28 Since Rule 201(a) adopts a new approach, the majority of prior
judicial notice cases will be of little value. 29 Legal texts will not be a
significant aid in making the distinction in unclear cases because text writers
tend to choose the most dear-cut examples to illustrate the different types
of facts.
The Advisory Committee did not anticipate any difficulty in distinguishing
between adjudicative and legislative facts. The Note on subdivision (a) merely
sets forth Professor Davis' definition. 30 This definition, however, may be
interpreted to reach different results when applied to the same set of facts.
This proposition is illustrated by a disagreement between Professor Davis,
the originator of the distinction, and Professor Cleary, the Reporter for the
Federal Rules, as to whether the facts judicially noticed in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau'3 ' were adjudicative or legislative.

data or rest content with what he has or what the parties present. He may reach a
conclusion in accord with the overwhelming weight of available data or against it." Morgan,
supra note 3, at 270. See also Currie,Appellate Courts' Use of Facts Outside of the Record
by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 39, 50; Levi,
The Nature of JudicialReasoning, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 395 (1965); Note, Social and Economic
Facts -Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 HARv. L.
REv. 692 (1948).
128. It is uncommon for a newly pronounced rule to require a body of interpretative
case law to fully define its meaning. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permit joinder of parties defendant when there is asserted against them "a fight to
relief . . . arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in.
the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a). The exact meaning of the phrases "series of transactions"
and "common question of law or fact" was left for judicial determination in cases. See
Poster v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 25 F.R.D. 18 (E.D. Pa. 1960); McNeil v. American Export
Lines, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Pa. 1958). As noted by the Florida Law Revision Council,
"[a]n evidence code cannot provide a clear answer to every question that may arise, and
the courts will still be left with the job of interstitial development; but a code can provide
the basic structure of the law of evidence." FLORIDA LAw REvISION COUNCIL, PRELIMINARY
DIAFr-

EvmENcE CODE -JUDCiAL

NOTICE

(1973).

129. Indeed, there is an indication that cases decided after the effective date of the
Federal Rules have avoided the adjudicative-legislative distinction. Of the six cases that
Wash.
have cited the new rule, only one has dealt with the distinction. Houser v. State,
540 P.2d 412, 414 (1975).
130. Adv. Comm. Note, at 204.
131. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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In Capital Gains the Securities and Exchange Commission sought an injunction compelling an investment adviser to disclose to clients the practice
of "scalping" - making a profit by trading on the market effect of recommenda132
the Second
tions to purchase or sell securities. Affirming the district court,
Circuit held that the defendant's practice did not constitute a "fraud" within
the meaning of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 because there was no
showing that the defendant's activity influenced the market price. 1 ' In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the idea that a small advisory
service could artificially stimulate the market by its recommendations was
"wholly speculative and.., at variance with common sense." 134 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the practice of "scalping" constituted a "fraud"
within the meaning of the Act. 135 Disagreeing with the lower courts as to
the defendant's ability to influence the market price, the Court noted that:
An adviser who, like respondents, secretly trades on the market effect
of his own recommendation may be motivated . . . to recommend a

given security not because of its potential for long-run price increase
(which would profit the client), but because of its potential for shortrun price increase in response to anticipated 136activity from the
recommendation

(which would profit the adviser).

A footnote 1 37 to this statement cited a law review note stating that invest38
ment advisers' recommendations may significantly influence market prices."
Professors Davis and Cleary have expressed contrary opinions as to whether
the facts in the law review note concerning the effects of investment advisers'
recommendations were adjudicative or legislative. In Davis' view the Court
cited the article for the proposition that the defendant secretly traded on the
market effect of his own recommendation. 1 9 The facts were adjudicative
since they concerned "whether defendants could or did influence the market
price . . ,,"140 On the other hand, Cleary stated that the case "involved
consulting non-evidence materials as an aid in determining whether a
particular disclosure sought to be compelled fell within the provisions of a
statute - a legislative rather than an adjudicative fact in the Committee's
view."'1*

The difference of opinion may result from the fact that the two experts
were not referring to the same proposition. Davis made it clear that in his
view the noticed facts were used by the Court to support its reference to the
132. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
133. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961), afj'd on rehearing,306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962).
134. 300 F.2d at 748.
135. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
136. Id. at 196.
137. Id. at 196 n.49.
138. Note, Securities Regulation: Stock Scalping by the Investment Adviser: Fraud
or Legitimate Business Practice?. 51 CALIF. L. REV. 232, 233 (1963).
139. Davis, supra note 8, at 521.
140. Id.
141. Cleary, Symposium, 1969 L. & Soc. ORDER 509, 510 (Foreward).
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defendant's secret trading on the market effects of his own recommendations.
Cleary, however, seemed to refer to the case as a whole1 42 or at least to the
Court's entire footnoted sentence. Cleary's possible rationale is that the Court
felt disclosure necessary to prevent the fraudulent effects of any conflicts
of interest between the adviser and his clients. Thus, the Court might have
used the fact that an adviser could influence the market price to illustrate
the potential for a conflict of interest.
If, however, Davis and Cleary were referring to the same proposition,
Cleary's conclusion that the noticed fact was legislative might indicate an
intention on behalf of the Advisory Committee to define facts as adjudicative
only when they clearly and explicitly apply to the immediate parties. Under
this view, the facts noticed in Capital Gains would be considered legislative
because they were general remarks about the ability of market advisers to
influence market prices. A further indication that the Advisory Committee
contemplated a restrictive interpretation of the definition of adjudicative
facts is its statement that Rule 201 operates within the "relatively narrow
area of adjudicative facts."'' 43
Suggested Approach for Making the Distinctionin UnclearCases
As noted earlier, the primary considerations in distinguishing adjudicative
and legislative facts are whether the facts concern the immediate parties
and whether the judge is performing an adjudicative or legislative function.
Usually, the judge performs an adjudicative function by noticing facts concerning the immediate parties and a legislative function when noticing
generalized propositions. However, there are instances in which the judge
employs generalized propositions when performing an adjudicative function;
conversely, the judge might notice facts concerning the immediate parties
when he is performing a legislative function.
The Advisory Committee pointed out the distinction between adjudicative
facts and legislative facts used to assess or appraise adjudicative facts.144 To
illustrate this distinction, the Committee referred to a pair of Illinois cases
14
involving the sufficiency of evidence to establish venue. In People v. Strook, 3
testimony that a crime was committed at 7956 South Chicago Avenue was
found insufficient to establish venue in Chicago because the court refused
to take judicial notice that the street address was located in Chicago.146 The
refusal to take judicial notice was based on the court's observation that
streets of the same name may be located in different cities.147 In the second
4
case, People v. Pride,1
8 the same court acknowledged a departure from earlier
142. In Capital Gains the Supreme Court made extensive use of legislative facts. For
example, in explaining the common law definition of "fraud," the Court cited not
only an equity treatise but also a private letter. 375 U.S. at 193 n.41.
143. Adv. Comm. Note, at 207 (emphasis added).
144. Adv. Comm. Note, at 203-04.
145. 347 Ill. 460, 179 N.E. 821 (1932).
146. Id. at 465-66, 179 N.E. at 822-23.
147. Id. at 466, 179 N.E. at 823.
148. 16 Ill.
2d 82, 87-88, 156 N.E.2d 551, 554-55 (1959). Accord, Orman v. State,
Ind. App.

.

332 N.E.2d 818, 819. (1975).
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holdings and determined that evidence of a crime's commission at 8900 South
Anthony Avenue was sufficient to establish venue in Chicago. To reach this
conclusion, the Pride court judicially noticed the common practice of omitting
149
the name of a city when referring to local addresses.
In the Committee's view, the fact not noticed in Strook - that a particular
street address was located in Chicago - was adjudicative, whereas the fact
noticed in Pride- the common practice of omitting the name of a city was a legislative fact used to assess the adjudicative facts of the case.' 50 While
it may be true that in Pride the court was employing judicial notice as a
part of its reasoning process to justify a departure from earlier cases, it is
nevertheless apparent that the facts in both cases would ultimately be used
to answer the same question- where did the defendant commit the offense
charged. In Strook the court refused to take judicial notice that a street
address was located in Chicago and held that the evidence was not sufficient
to establish venue. In Pride the court did not take judicial notice that a
street address was located in Chicago but held that the evidence was sufficient
to establish venue by judicially noticing the common practice of omitting
the name of a city when referring to local addresses. Thus, it seems that a
court may avoid noticing a particular fact about the immediate parties by
noticing a more general fact and subsequently applying it to answer the
same question that the adjudicative fact not noticed would have been used
to answer. The court is using a general proposition, which is seemingly
considered legislative by the Advisory Committee, although performing the
arguably adjudicative function of determining where an immediate party
committed a particular act.
The likelihood that judicially noticed facts will be deemed legislative
facts that are utilized to assess adjudicative facts is enhanced by the tendency
of the courts to notice general facts rather than particular facts.'51 Consequently, general facts will frequently be used to deduce specific facts relating
to the immediate parties.152 For example, one court'

53

judicially noticed

generalized propositions from a standardized table of stopping distances to
determine that the defendant could not have stopped her car in time
to avoid striking a child who suddenly darted in front of her car. The
same court,

54

however, refused to permit judicial notice of precise stopping

149. 16 Ill. 2d at 88, 156 N.E.2d at 554-55.
150. Adv. Comm. Note, at 203-04.
151. "A court is more willing to notice a general than a specific fact, as for example,
the approximate time of the normal period of human gestation, but not the precise maximum and minimum limits." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §328.
152. Comment, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13 ViLL. L. Rv.
528, 533 (1968).

153. Ennis v. Dupree, 262 N.C. 224, 229, 136 S.E.2d 702, 706 (1964). See Wise v. George
C. Rothwell, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 563, 568 n.10 (D. Del. 1974) (judicial notice taken of
average perception reaction and stopping distances to determine whether defendant could
have avoided collision with plaintiff's tractor-trailer). See also Comment, Judicial Notice Disputability and Appellate Practice Regarding Judicial Notice of Stopping Distances, 38

Mo. L. REv. 678 (1973).
154. Hughes v. Vestal, 264 N.C. 500, 506, 142 S.E.2d 361, 366 (1965). The Hughes court
distinguished Ennis v. Dupree, 262 N.C. 224, 136 S.E.2d 702 (1964) in the following manner:
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distances from the same table. Thus, judicial notice that an average car
traveling 55 miles per hour could be stopped within 211 feet would not
be taken to prove that the plaintiff, who had stopped within 230 feet, was
traveling in excess of 55 miles per hour. 155 In the Committee's view, while
the general facts noticed in the former case were legislative facts used to
assess the adjudicative facts, the specific fact not noticed in the latter case
was a true adjudicative fact. 58 In both cases the judicially noticed facts
were used to answer questions concerning the actions of the immediate
parties-an adjudicative function.
Thus, in some cases, it is not only difficult to ascertain whether a general
fact relates to the immediate parties, but it is also difficult to decide whether
the judge is performing an adjudicative or legislative function. 157 In such
cases, to determine whether a particular fact is adjudicative and thus within
the scope of Rule 201, it may be helpful to analyze the facts by employing an
approach that emphasizes the likelihood of a party's having specialized
knowledge concerning the noticed facts as applied to the particular case. 58
"It is true that this Court has in a few cases made casual reference to stopping-distance
tables. The references were rhetorical and illustrative rather than judicial notice to support
decision." 264 N.C. at 507, 142 S.E.2d at 366 (citations omitted). A court's characterization
of the way in which a particular fact was used may be helpful in determining whether
that fact was adjudicative or legislative. It is dear, however, that a fact used in a "rhetorical
and illustrative" way may nevertheless relate to the immediate parties.
155. 264 N.C. at 503, 142 S.E.2d at 365-66.
156. Adv. Comm. Note, at 204.
157. The same facts may be adjudicative in one case but legislative in another
case. For example, in Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 315 (5th Cir. 1974), the court took
judicial notice of current inflationary trends to determine whether the EPA had acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in denying an extension for the implementation of quality air
standards. In this case, the facts relating to economic conditions were adjudicative because
they concerned the motive or intent of an immediate party. In contrast, the court in
Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1975), judicially noticed
inflationary trends in the nation's economy to determine that the possible future rate of
inflation should not be included in a present rule for calculating future damages. In
Johnson the facts relating to economic conditions were legislative because they were used
by the court in exercising its discretion whether to change a common law rule.
Similarly, facts relating to ecofiomic conditions used to assess the reasonableness of
damages or settlements are legislative. See Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 82 (D.N.J.
1975); Helfand v. New America Fund, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 86, 92 (1974). However, at least
one court has apparently reached an opposite conclusion. Considering an award of prejudgment interest, the court in Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609, 651 (D. Md.
1975), cited Rule 201 as authority for judicial notice of the recent decline in the
purchasing value of the dollar.
158. The approach suggested is very similar to the method used to determine whether
an evidentiary hearing should be afforded in connection with action by an administrative
agency. In this area the principle that has evolved is that "a party who has a
sufficient interest or right at stake in a determination of governmental action should
be entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet, with the weapons of rebuttal evidence,
cross-examination, and argument, unfavorable evidence of adjudicative facts .... ." K.
DAvis, supra note 109, §7.03. Illustrative of this principle is a statement by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in WBEN v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 618 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968): "Adjudicatory hearings serve an important function when the
agency bases its decision on the peculiar situation of individual parties who know more
about this than anyone else. But when , . . a new policy is based upon the general
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5 9
For example, in Essex County PreservationAss'n v. Campbell,'
a conservation group brought an action against federal and state officials to enjoin a
highway widening project. In evaluating the claims of the conservation
group, the court took judicial notice of the fact that "any increase in the
size of a highway is bound to have some deleterious effect on the environment."'160 Professor Davis might label this an adjudicative fact since it was
used by the court to ascertain whether the defendant's proposed action would
harm the environment. In contrast, the Advisory Committee would probably
consider it a legislative fact used to appraise the adjudicative facts because of its
general nature. Under the suggested approach, the court would ask whether
the federal and state officials have any particular knowledge relating to the
fact noticed. For example, the officials might be able to show that the proposed
project would have at most a minimal impact on the environment or that
pressing needs for a wider highway outweighed any alleged harm to the
surrounding area. Since the function being performed by the judge
in taking judicial notice is unclear, the fact should be deemed adjudicative
because the party adversely affected has a particularized knowledge concerning the fact noticed. 161 The procedural safeguards required by Rule
201(e) would ensure an opportunity to present those facts to the court.
Courts may judicially notice facts about the immediate parties when
performing a legislative function. In Ponce v. Housing Authority, 62 tenants
sought an injunction against an assessment of rent increases at low-rent
farm labor housing projects. After finding an infringement of the tenants'
property rights, the Ponce court determined that the tenants were entitled
to a hearing on the amount of the assessment.163 In deciding what procedural
safeguards were required at the hearing, the court took judicial notice of
the fact that "farm labor Families, as a class, receive substantially less income
than is received by the average American family.' 64 Using this fact, the court
reasoned that a rise in the cost of housing would have a severe impact on
the tenants; therefore, substantial safeguards were warranted. 65 The fact
judicially noticed was clearly legislative because it was used by the court
to exercise its discretion in determining its chosen course of action. It did
not concern the immediate parties or their actions, nor was it a fact that
would normally go to the jury.

characteristics of an industry, rational decision is not furthered by requiring the agency
to lose itself in an excursion into detail that too often obscures fundamental issues rather
than clarifies them." See K. DAVIS, supra note 109, §7.03. Compare Londoner v. Denver,
210 U.S. 373 (1908) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
159. 399 F. Supp. 208 (D. Mass. 1975).
160. Id. at 211.
161. Contrast the situation in Campbell with a case in which officials challenged the
validity of a statute requiring the preparation of an environmental impact statement
before the commencement of a highway widening project. In the latter case, the parties
would have no special knowledge of the validity of the statute and the same fact would
be clearly legislative.
162. 389 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
163. Id. at 649.
164. Id.
165.

Id.
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In contrast, the court in Collins v. Vitek' 66 noticed a fact concerning the
immediate parties to determine what procedural safeguards were to be
afforded a state prisoner challenging disciplinary action taken against him
by prison officials. The plaintiff contended that he was entitled to a review
board comprised of different persons than those who had composed the
disciplinary board that had passed sentence on him. In determining that an
impartial review board was not necessary for due process, the court took
judicial notice of the small size of the prison staff, a fact that would make
review impossible by officials totally uninvolved in any phase of the disciplinary
process.1 7 Thus, in exercising a legislative function by determining what
procedural safeguards were mandated by due process, the Collins court
judicially noticed a fact concerning an immediate party. In such ambiguous
cases, the fact should be treated as adjudicative and therefore within the
scope of Rule 201. Considerations of fairness to the parties in assuring that
the fact noticed is indisputable outweigh any needs of the judge for flexibility
in the judicial reasoning process.
In contrast to facts that are difficult to classify as either adjudicative or
legislative, some facts are properly classified as both adjudicative and legislative.8 8 For example, in Powell v. Texas,8 9 the Supreme Court was called
on to determine the constitutionality of punishing chronic alcoholics for
intoxication in a public place. The Court resorted to various extra-record
facts to determine the current views of the medical profession concerning
whether alcoholism was a disease. The facts noticed were adjudicative in
that they were used to determine whether the defendant Powell was afflicted
with a disease17o In addition, however, the same facts were used in a legislative sense to determine whether "as a matter of medical science alcoholism
was so clearly a disease that a constitutional principle should be developed
to prohibit punishment for alcoholism."''
166. 375 F. Supp. 856 (D.N.H. 1974).
167. Id. at 862.
168. "Just as some questions have to be regarded as mixed questions of law and
fact and can be so regarded without destroying the necessary and useful distinction between
law and fact, so some facts have to be regarded as mixed adjudicative and legislative
facts without destroying the necessary and useful distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts." K. DAvis, supra note 109, §15.04. Thus, even though a court finds that a fact is
legislative, it must still examine the fact in light of the case as a whole to determine
whether the fact is also adjudicative.
169. 592 U.S. 514 (1968).
170. K. DAviS, supra note 109, §15.03.
171. Id. A similar problem may arise when a court takes judicial notice of the prior
records of a case currently before the court. For example, in Alexander v. HEW, 392 F.
Supp. I (N.D. Ill.
1975), a plaintiff who had brought two previous actions claiming a
denial of civil rights petitioned the court for permission to institute a third party complaint. In determining whether to permit the third party complaint, the court took judicial
notice of dismissals in the previous actions as proof that the plaintiff had been given a fun
opportunity to litigate her grievances. The fact of the prior action was in one sense
legislative because it was used by the judge to determine what course of action to take.
However, the fact was also adjudicative because it related to the actions of an immediate
party. In Alexander the need for notice and an opportunity to be heard was particularly
evident because the two prior actions that caused the judge to deny the third party
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When the same facts are both adjudicative and legislative, those facts
should be treated as adjudicative for purposes of judicial notice. To do
otherwise would deprive a party of the procedural safeguards to which he
is entitled under Rule 201.
Thus, the adjudicative or legislative nature of a particular fact determines
whether judicial notice of that fact is within the scope of Rule 201. If the
fact to be noticed is governed by the federal rule, it must be indisputable and
is not subject to challenge. Furthermore, judicial notice of adjudicative
facts must be accompanied by important procedural safeguards for the parties'
protection.
In summary, there are at least three situations in which the applicability
of Rule 201 is uncertain. First, if the judge employs general propositions to
assess the adjudicative facts of the case, it is difficult to determine whether
he is performing an adjudicative or legislative function. Second, the judge
complaint were both subject to question because of actions taken by the magistrates in those
cases. See also United States v. Walters, 510 F.2d 887, 890 nA (3d Cir. 1975) (judicial notice
taken of briefs and petitions filed in state courts to determine whether plaintiff had exhausted
his state remedies); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 360 n.12 (3d Cir.
1974) (judicial notice taken of district court docket to determine that a hearing on damages
was held on a particular day).
Closely related to judicial notice of the prior record of the same case is judicial
notice of the records of previous cases. "The doctrine that the record of a previous case
may be judicially noticed is deeply established, and the doctrine seems to be used irrespective
of the legislative or adjudicative character of the facts." Davis, supra note 8, at 523-24 n.38.
It is not known to what extent Rule 201 will change this existing practice. However, it is
clear that facts relating to the records of previous cases are capable of classification as
adjudicative or legislative. For example, in Insurance Co. of N. America v. National Steel
Serv. Center, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 512, 518 (N.D. W. Va. 1975), the court judicially noticed
the records of prior litigation to determine the extent of the insurance company's knowledge
of the circumstances underlying the workmen's compensation coverage of an injured worker.
The facts were adjudicative because they related to the motive or intent of an immediate
party. See also United States v. M.P.M., Inc.. 397 F. Supp. 78, 103 (D. Colo. 1975) (judicial
notice taken of six prior actions to determine that the government's institution of the
current proceeding was not an abuse of prosecutorial discretion); Oburn v. Shapp, 393 F.
Supp. 561, 565 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (judicial notice taken of consent decree in a prior action
to determine whether state police academy discriminated in its hiring practices).
In contrast, the court in Cone Mills Corp. v. Hurdle, 369 F. Supp. 426, 429 (N.D. Miss.
1974), judicially noticed the many prior contract actions to determine the enforceability vel
non of contracts for the advance or forward sale of cotton fiber. The facts noticed were
legislative because they were used by the court in determining what course of action to
take. See also Moeck v. Zajackowski, 385 F. Supp. 463, 466 (W.D. Wis. 1974) (judicial notice
taken of hundreds of prior cases filed by inmates of state prisons to determine that a
warden could not interfere with the plaintiff's right to appear at trial); Yelverton v. Driggers,
370 F. Supp. 612, 617 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (judicial notice taken of prior cases establishing
the existence of impediments to black political participation in the state to determine
whether a reapportionment plan was unconstitutional).
Whether judicially noticed facts relating to prior records of current cases and of previous
cases should be classified as adjudicative or legislative for purposes of Rule 201 is a
question that needs to be resolved. In a recent survey by the author of federal cases
decided in 1974 and 1975 in which the taking of judicial notice was explicitly acknowledged,
21% (15 out of 71) involved the type of facts discussed above. The need for procedural
safeguards in cases in which such facts are adjudicative indicates that these cases should
come within the scope of Rule 201.
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may use facts concerning the immediate parties when performing a legislative
function; Third, the same facts may be used in both an adjudicative and a
legislative manner.
When the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts is unclear,
the primary reasons for the distinction - fairness to the parties and flexibility
for the judge in the reasoning process -once more become key considerations.
In uncertain cases, the best approach is that fairness to the parties should be
the overriding consideration. Despite any indication by the Advisory Committee to the contrary, if it can be shown that a party has a particularized
knowledge to contribute to the ascertainment of the propriety of taking
judicial notice, then the fact should be deemed adjudicative.
THE NFY. To CODIFY JUDICIAL NOTICE OF LEGISLATIV FACTs

The failure to include legislative facts within the scope of Rule 201
presents the issue of whether judicial notice of these facts is susceptible
to codification. There are three approaches to the question whether legislative facts should be included in a rule governing judicial notice. The first
approach makes no distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts.
This approach is represented by codifications formulated prior to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, including the Model Code of Evidence, 172 the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 173 and some state codes. 4 The second and prevailing
view, exemplified by Rule 201, limits any attempt at codification to adjudicative facts. 175 The third approach, advocated by Davis, suggests that both
adjudicative and legislative facts be included in a rule on judicial notice
with different requirements and procedures afforded each. 76
The scope of Rule 201 is limited to adjudicative facts. The Advisory
Committee's Note on subdivision (a) explained that the rationale confining
the rule's regulation to adjudicative facts relates to the differences between
adjudicative and legislative facts. 7 7 In the Committee's view the particular
nature of legislative facts renders them inappropriate for codification for
three main reasons. First, the rule's requirement that facts noticed be indisputable would eliminate judicial notice of legislative facts if they were
172.

MODEL CODE Evw. 801, 802.

173. UNiF. R. EvID. 9. The Uniform Rules of Evidence were amended in 1974. The
Rules now distinguish between adjudicative and legislative facts. UNiF. R. Evm. 201(a).
174. See, e.g., CAL. Evw. CODE §§450-60 (West 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§60-401 to -470
(1964).
175. "Whatever the ultimate doctrinal synthesis of judicial notice of adjudicative facts
comes to be, a viable formulation of rules laying down a similarly rigid procedural
etiquette with regard to legislative facts has not proved feasible. Given the current recognition
that nonadjudicative facts are inextricably part and parcel of the law formulation process
in a policy-oriented jurisprudence, there may be no need to formulate a distinctly judicial
notice-captioned procedure with regard to nonadjudicative facts . . . . [W]hatever rules
govern the submission of law in the litigation process have already preempted the nonadjudicative field and made unnecessary separate treatment thereof within the context
of judicial notice." C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, §334.
.176. See Davisi supra note 8, at 525-27..

177. Adv. Comm. Note, at 202.
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included in the scope of the rule since legislative facts are seldom indisputable.1?8 Second, "any formal requirements of notice other than those
already inherent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging briefs" 179 are deemed inappropriate

where legislative

facts are

concerned. Third, "any requirement of formal findings at any level '' i s° of
judicial notice of legislative facts was considered inappropriate by the Advisory Committee.
Although the Committee explained why adjudicative and legislative facts
cannot be treated identically in a judicial notice rule, it does not offer a
satisfactory justification for the complete exclusion of legislative facts from
Rule 201.181 The distinction must be made between a subject that is truly
"inappropriate" for codification and one that is either difficult to codify or
capable of being codified only in the most general language. It is true that
application of the indisputability standard of Rule 201(b) to legislative facts
would severely restrict their judicial notice. Judges consistently take judicial
notice of disputable legislative facts.

8

2

The appropriate solution would be to

permit notice of legislative facts if the court believes them, whether or not
they are subject to reasonable dispute. 183 Rule 201 should be amended to
include judicial notice of legislative facts. The provisions governing notice
of legislative facts should be in accordance with existing judicial practices permitting judicial notice of disputable legislative facts, requiring minimal
procedural safeguards, and. calling for formal findings when the fact noticed
84
is critical to the resolution of the controversy.1
The inclusion of legislative facts in Rule 201 would ensure the provision
of adequate procedural safeguards when legislative facts are noticed. Although
recognizing the value of procedural safeguards by incorporating them into
Rule 201, the Advisory Committee nevertheless stated that formal notice requirements are unnecessary for judicial notice of legislative facts. The Committee did acknowledge that present practice often affords an opportunity
to be heard and to exchange briefs. The fact that some notice is presently
given indicates both the desirability and the need 8 5 for some safeguards. To
avoid unduly limiting the judge's need for flexibility in the reasoning process,
safeguards afforded for judicial notice of legislative facts should be less rigid
178.
179.

Id. at 203.
Id.

180. Id.
181. Davis, supra note 8, at 526.
182. See, e.g., Mogul v. G.M.C., 391 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1975)

(judicial

notice taken of the fact that Cadillac did not constitute an independent product market
despite compelling argument by the plaintiff to the contrary); Application of Watson, 517
F.2d 465, 474-75 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (judicial notice taken of an FDA order concerning the
toxic effects of a particular substance notwithstanding the court's recognition of an affidavit
showing that the substance had no adverse effects).
183. Davis, supra note 8, at 527.

184. Id.
185. One court has indicated that the failure to notify a party of judicial notice
of a legislative fact may deprive the party of his right to argue the legal effect
of the noticed fact on appeal. People v. Matula, 336 P.2d 1000, rev'd on other grounds,
52 Cal. 2d 591, 342 P.2d 252 (1959).
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than those provided for notice of adjudicative facts. A satisfactory solution

would be to require notice when the judge reasonably believes that challenge
is a substantial possibility. 86 Furthermore, permitting the parties to submit
information relating to legislative facts would guard against judicial error by
supplying the judge with additional information with which to evaluate
the propriety of taking judicial notice.
The Advisory Committee believed that requiring formal findings of judicial
notice of legislative facts at any level was inappropriate.' 8s Noting that the
Committee's view was contradictory to existing practices, Professor Davis
has stated that courts usually identify findings of legislative facts that
significantly affect their decision. 88 The problem with his conclusion is the
impossibility of assessing the number of decisions made without explicit statement of findings of legislative facts.'8 9 Since existing practice is really unascertainable, the important question is whether it is a good policy to require
formal findings of legislative facts. While the value of formal findings of
peripheral legislative facts may be minimal, there surely are benefits to be
derived from formal findings of critical legislative facts. The modern trend
is for judges to be explicit in stating reasons for policy decisions. 190 Requiring
the court to identify significant legislative facts affecting their decision would
be a major step in promoting candor in the courts.' 91
186. Davis, supra note 8, at 527.
187. Adv. Comm. Note, at 203. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
188. Davis, supra note 8, at 526.
189. Cf. K. DAvis, supra note 109, §15.03: "A most vital observation is that the
difference between appearing to stay within the record and frankly acknowledging resort
to extra-record sources for legislative facts is usually only a difference in the degree of
articulation of grounds for decision. If all judgment has a factual basis only a part of
which comes from the record, the judge or administrative officer who fully explains the
process of arriving at his decision will appear to go beyond the record, but the judge
or officer who merely announces conclusions will appear to stay within the record."
supra note 2,§331. "The discussion surrounding recent Supreme
190. C. McCo cinK,
Court decisions has often included references to an assumed tendency of the judges to
rely upon authority other than 'accepted sources of law.' Critics of current decision have
pointed to the use of unconventional authority as a significant proof of the present Court's
departure from the approved pathways of its predecessors. Supporters have maintained
that Supreme Court Justices have always been influenced by considerations of social
values and desirability of results, and that the Court is merely recognizing this fact and
exploring these considerations openly." Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary
Source Material: 1965 Term, 57 GEO. WASH. UJ. 55 (1968). See also Newland, Legal
Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court, 7 KAN. L. Riv. 477 (1959); Scurlock,
Scholarship and the Courts, 32 U. Mo.-KAN. CrrY L. REv. 228 (1964).
191. One writer has listed as a primary factor contributing to a general lack of con-

fidence in the judicial system the "tendency of judges to go outside the briefs, record,
and argument of counsel to inform themselves about the case at bar." Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections, 35 LAw & CO=TrMP. PROB. 69, 86
(1970). This problem would be somewhat alleviated if judges were required to reveal outside
sources for central legislative facts.
When the judge finds legislative facts, he is performing the same function that the legislature performs. However, the legislature is a large, diverse body representing many segments
of the society. In contrast, the judge is an individual who must indicate his responsiveness
to the needs of society. "Mhe judge who writes an opinion has the task of reflecting the
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Inclusion of legislative facts in Rule 201 would effectuate full codification
of the basic concept of judicial notice. Existing practice indicates that decisions
on judicial notice involve three variables: 192 the extent to which the facts
noticed are adjudicative or legislative, the extent to which the facts noticed
are disputable or indisputable, and the extent to which the facts noticed are
critical or peripheral to the controversy. 191 Judicial notice of an adjudicative
fact central to the controversy may require indisputability. On the other
hand, judicial notice is often taken of disputable, peripheral legislative
facts.19 4 "A rule that leaves out of account one of the essential variables that
[is] intrinsic to the problem and that the courts in fact use cannot be a
sound solution of the basic problem of judicial notice." 195
The new Federal Rules of Evidence attempt to codify the existing law
of evidence by changing what is unsatisfactory 96 to promote uniformity in
the federal courts. The Committee apparently did not find the existing
practices of judicially noticing legislative facts unsatisfactory because, although
it failed to set forth explicit guidelines, its apparent intention was continued
use of these practices by federal judges.197 The result is a satisfactory, but uncodified, body of law.
What part of the law remains uncodified? It has been suggested that at
98
least 75 percent of judicial notice cases involve legislative facts.' A recent
99
In a
survey, however, indicates that the figure of 75 percent is too high.
outlines of the debate, to show that he is aware of the different voices and that his thought
processes have traveled through an inner debate prior to determination." Levi, The Nature
of Judicial Reasoning, 32 U. Ci. L. REv. 395, 397-98 (1965). A judge should reveal central
legislative facts that influence his thought process when reaching a decision. See also
Akehurst, Statements of Reasons for Judicial and Administrative Decisions, 33 MODERN L.
REV. 154 (1970).
192. Davis, supra note 8, at 515, 527.
193. See, e.g., TWA v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973) ("The more critical an issue is to a case, the more reluctant
courts should be to determine it by taking judicial notice.").
Closely related to the distinction between central and peripheral facts is the distinction
between ultimate and non-ultimate facts. Courts are more willing to notice facts that
would not be determinative of the case. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §328. But see Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (judicial notice of the legislative fact that racially
segregated schools cannot be equal because of the creation of a feeling of inferiority within
the minority was determinative of the case).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Houghton, 388 F. Supp. 773, 775 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (in an
essentially unnecessary account of the defendant's life history, the court took judicial notice
of the fact that "it is almost impossible for a man of ordinary means to support two major
vices at the same time.").
195. Davis, supra note 8, at 527.
196. Id. at 525.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 525-26.
199. The disparity in the results of the two surveys may evolve from the nature of the
surveys themselves. Professor ])avis' conclusion that 75% of judicial notice cases involve
legislative facts was based on a random sampling of 28 Supreme Court cases. Davis, supra
note 8, at 525. The cases in Davis' survey are cited in 2 K. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §15.08 (Supp. 1965). In contrast, a more recent survey by the author included 71
federal court cases decided during a two-year period in which the taking of judicial notice
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survey of all federal cases decided in 1974 and 1975200 in which the taking of
judicial notice was explicitly acknowledged, while 61 percent of the cases
involved judicial notice of adjudicative facts, 20 1 39 percent involved notice
of legislative facts. 20 2 Since a rule can be formulated with appropriate prowas explicitly mentioned. Furthermore, the different results may stem from the nature
of cases decided by the Supreme Court as opposed to those of the federal district courts,
which constituted a majority of cases in the recent survey.
In the recent survey, the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts was made
pursuant to the approach suggested in the preceding section, in which facts in unclear
cases were deemed adjudicative if it was likely that the parties had a particularized
knowledge to contribute.
200. The survey included all federal cases decided in 1974 and all 1975 cases reported
as of Feb. 1, 1976.
201. Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 494 n.8 (3d Cir. 1975); Board of Trustees v.
Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel.
Geisler v. Walters, 510 F.2d 887, 890 n.4 (3d Cir. 1975); Elliott v. Michael James, Inc., 507
F.2d 1179, 1185-86 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Merrill Trust Co. v. Bradford, 507 F.2d 467, 469 (5th
Cir. 1974); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 1974); Sierra
Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982, 989 (5ih Cir. 1974); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d.289, 315 (5th
Cir. 1974); Sholars v. Matter, 491 F.2d 279, 281 n.8 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
970 (1975); Dells, Inc. v. Mundt, 400 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lefkovits v.
Board of Elections, 400 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Sierra Club v. Morton,
400 F. Supp. 610, 633 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Washington Mobilization Comm'n v. Cullinane,
400 F. Supp. 186, 198 n.23 (D.D.C. 1975); Essex County Preservation Ass'n v. Campbell,
399 F. Supp. 208, 211 (D. Mass. 1975); Bradshaw v. Oklahoma, 398 F. Supp. 838, 845
(E.D. Okla. 1975); Government Employees, Local 1858 v. Callaway, 398 F. Supp. 176, 195
(N.D. Ala. 1975); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 103 (D. Colo. 1975);
Tasby v. Peek, 596 F. Supp. 952, 955 (W.D. Ark. 1975); Aiple Towing Co., Inc. v. MV
Tri-W, 396 F. Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. La. 1975); Ross v. Brown, 396 F. Supp. 192, 195 n.2
(E.D. Tex. 1975); Hanback v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 396 F. Supp. 80, 89 (D.S.C. 1975);
Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 394 F. Supp. 817, 837-38 n.19 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Obur v. Shapp,
393 F. Supp. 561, 565 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 521. F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975); Alexander v. HEW,
392 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Insurance Co. of N. America v. National Steel Serv.
Center, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 512, 518 (N.D. W. Va. 1975); In re Copeland, 391 F. Supp. 134,
138 (D. Del. 1975); Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 155 n.124 (D.D.C. 1975); Iberian
Tankers Co. v. Gates Constr. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States
v. Houghton, 388 F. Supp. 773, 775 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Mobil Oil Corp. v. TVA, 387 F.
Supp. 498, 500 n.1 (Ni). Ala. 1974); Clark v. Anderson, 387 F. Supp. 404, 406 (E.D. Okla.
1974); Times Newspapers, Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 387 F. Supp. 189, 193 n.3 (C.D.
Cal. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 382
F. Supp. 999, 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Wise v. George Rothwell, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 563, 568
n.10 (D. Del. 1974), aft'd, 513 F.2d 627 (1975); Conley v. Southern Import Sales, Inc., 382
F. Supp. 121, 124 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Smith v. Vowell, 379 F. Supp. 139, 143 (W.D. Tex),
aff'd, 504 F.2d 759 (1974); Blanning v. Tisch, 378 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Rankin v. Christian, 376 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (D.V.L 1974); Collins v. Vitek, 375 F. Supp.
856, 862 (D.N.H. 1974); Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782, 789 (N.D. Ohio 1974);
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 518 F.2d 1298, 1299 (Ct. Cl. 1975); McNamara
Constr. Co. v. United States, 509 F.2d 1166, 1168 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Application of Yardley,
493 F.2d 1389, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
202. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 US. 7, 14-15 (1975); Trade Banner Line, Inc. v. Caribbean
Steamship Co., 521 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1975); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 644
n.138 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 544 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1975); Mid-America
Transp. Co., Inc. v. National Marine Service, Inc., 497 F.2d 776, 780 (8th Cir. 1974); EEOC
v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F. Supp. 1225,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 6

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. XXVIII

visions for judicial notice of both adjudicative and legislative facts, there is
no justification for the exclusion of legislative facts from a rule that purports
to codify the law of judicial notice.
RULE 201 AND STATE EVIDENCE LAW

Although Rule 201 applies only to proceedings in the federal courts, the
federal rule can be expected to influence state evidence law in two principle
ways. First, state courts faced with judicial notice problems may look to
the federal rule for guidance. Second, the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence may encourage codification of state judicial notice principles
patterned on the federal rodel.
Common Law
The great majority of state evidence law is uncodified and therefore controlled by law principles developed by state courts. There is wide disparity
among the states in regard to the various aspects of judicial notice. For
example, the states disagree as to the indisputability and conclusiveness of
judicially noticed facts. Although some states adhere to Morgan's theory that
noticed facts must be indisputable and are not subject to challenge by rebuttal evidence, 20 3 many states follow the opposite approach expressed by
Wigmore. 20 4 In some instances, courts of the same state have followed different
theories. 20 5- However, even though as a general rule no explicit distinction is
1235 nn. 3 & 4 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609, 651 (D.
Md. 1975); Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
U.S. appeal pend'g; Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175,
183 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 82 (D.N.J. 1975); National
Car Rental Systems, Inc., v. Council Wholesale Distribs., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (M.D.
Ga. 1974); Mogul v. G.M.C., 391 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Ponce v. Housing
Authority, 389 F. Supp. 635, 649 (E.D. Cal. 1975); Illinois Produce Int'l, Inc. v. Reliance
Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 29, 35 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Fano v. Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664, 667 (D.
Mass.), aff'd, 520 F.2d 374, cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 444 (1975); Moeck v. Zajackowski, 385 F.
Supp. 463, 466 (W.D. Wis. 1974); Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 376 F. Supp.
473. 479 (D.R.I. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975); Colby College
v. Colby College-N.H., 374 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.N.H. 1974), vacated, 508 F.2d 804 (Ist
Cir. 1975); Aikens v. Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425, 435 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Yelverton v. Driggers,
370 F. Supp, 612, 617 (M.D. Ala. 1974); McHugh v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271, 1274
(D.S.C. 1974); Williams v. TWA, 369 F. Supp. 797, 802 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afl'd, 509 F.2d
942 (1975); Cone Mills Corp. v. Hurdle, 369 F. Supp. 426, 429 (N.D. Miss. 1974); Helfand
v. New America Fund, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 86, 92 (1974), vacated, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975);
Colonial Metals Co. v. United States, 494 F.2d 1355, 1360 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
203. See, e.g., Utah Constr. Co. v. Berg, 68 Ariz. 285, 291, 205 P.2d 367, 370 (1949);
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ford, 68 Ariz. 190, 196, 203 P.2d 633, 638 (1949); Commonwealth v.
Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68, 72, 21 N.E. 228, 229 (1889); Soyland v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 71 S.D. 522, 26 N.W.2d 696, 699 (1947).
204. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Radley, 134 Kan. 704, 708-09, 8 P.2d 386, 388
(1932); Macht v. Hecht, Co., 191 Md. 98, 102, 59 A.2d 754, 756 (1948); Scheufler v. Continental
Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 886, 896, 169 S.W.2d 359, 365 (1943); Timson v. Manufacturers' Coal &
Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580, 598, 119 S.W. 565, 569 (1909); Morrison v. Thomas, 481 S.W.2d
605, 605 (Mo. App. 1972). See McNaughton, supra note 7, at 796 n.3.
205. Compare Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 Ill. App. 159, 162, 87 N.E.2d 30,
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made between civil and criminal cases, 20 6 the states are almost uniform in
allowing rebuttal of judicially noticed facts in criminal cases. 20 7 While some
states have recognized the difference between adjudicative and legislative
facts, 208 most have treated judicially noticed facts without regard to their
adjudicative or legislative nature.
Because of its recent enactment, it is perhaps too early to assess the impact
of Rule 201 on state decisional law. Nevertheless, there are recent indications
that state courts faced with judicial notice problems will look to the federal
rule for guidelines. The supreme court of Washington recently relied on
Rule 201 to support its decision to uphold judicial notice of a legislative
fact.2 09 Following the rationale of the Advisory Committee, the court observed
that the "restrictive rules governing notice are not applicable to factual
findings that simply supply premises in the process of legal reasoning. 210
Thus, judicial notice was appropriately taken of studies that contained data
supporting statutory age discrimination against those under age 21, even
though the studies concededly were not sources of indisputable accuracy. 21'
In addition, a recent Rhode Island case relied on Rule 201(g) to buttress
its decision that the permanence of an injury was improperly judicially
noticed.2 12 The court did not decide whether the permanence of an injury
was a proper subject for judicial notice,213 nor did it attempt to resolve the
Morgan-Wigmore controversy. 21 4 Rather, the procedure was improper because the jury was not informed of the contemplated taking of judicial
notice. Citing Rule 201(g), the court stated that whenever a trial judge deems
it "appropriate to take judicial notice of a certain scientific fact and
accordingly intends that a jury properly consider it ... he must at least communicate that fact and those intentions to the jury."2115

State Evidence Codes
Three states codified their evidence law before the appearance of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 21 6 These early codifications were for the most
31 (1949) (matters judicially noticed are indisputable) with People v. Krall, 29 I1. App.
3d 86, 87-88, 329 N.E.2d 441, 442 (1975) (matters judicially noticed may be rebutted by
testimony at trial).
206. But see State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951).
207. See, e.g., State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 216 A.2d 625 (1966); People v. Krall,
Ind.
,
, 306 N.E.2d
q9 Ill. App. 3d 86, 329 N.E.2d 441 (1975); Sumpter v. State,
95, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 811 (1974); State v. Miller, 102 N.H. 260, 154 A.2d 699
(1959).
208. See, e.g., Milligan v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 49596, 204 N.E.2d 504, 509 (1965); Lorland Civic Ass'n v. DiMatteo, 10 Mich. App. 129, 135-36,
157 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1968). See K. DAvIs, supra note 109, §7.03 n.10.
,540 P.2d 412;414 (1975).
Wash.
,
209. Houser v. State,
210. Id. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, §334.
Wash. at
, 540 P.2d at 414-15.
211.
R.I.
,341 A.2d 30 (1975).
212. Andrews v. Masse,
,341 A.2d at 32 n.6.
213. Id. at
,341 A.2d at 33 n.7.
214. Id. at
S215.
Id.
.216. CAL. Evm. CODE §§1-1605 (West 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§60-401 to -470 (1964);
-: ,I..
NJ.R. Evm. 9-12 (1976) .
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part patterned on the Model Code and the Uniform Rules. The codes of
California, 217 Kansas, 218 and New Jersey 2 9 require that judicially noticed facts

be indisputable. None of the codes distinguish between adjudicative and
legislative facts 220 or between civil and criminal cases.

The promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence has encouraged renewed interest in the codification of state evidence rules.221 Since the appearance
of the first draft of the Federal Rules, four additional states have enacted
22
evidence codes, 222 and at least three others are considering codification. " The

judicial notice rules of both New Mexico and Wisconsin are identical to
Rule 201224 with the exception that no special provision is made for the jury
instruction in criminal cases. The Nevada code requires indisputability for
judicially noticed facts225 but makes no distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts.
Florida'sEvidence Code
The transition from common law to codified treatment of judicial notice
often entails a significant change in existing judicial practices. For example,
while many states have traditionally permitted challenge of disputable
judicially noticed facts, 22 6 the current trend in codification is to require indisputability and conclusiveness.227 Furthermore, it is a common practice
among the states to adopt only portions of a federal model, rejecting other
portions in favor of provisions of their own choosing. 228 For instance, a state
217. CAL. EvID. CODE § §451, 452 (West 1968).
218. KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-409 (1964).
219. N.J.R. EvID. 9 (1976). In some instances, the requirements of the state codes
are substantially more stringent than the corresponding federal provisions. For example,
Rule 201 generally requires that the judge instruct the jury in civil cases to accept
judicially noticed facts as conclusive. In contrast, the New Jersey code provides that
on request the judge shall "(a) instruct the trier of fact to accept a matter judicially
noticed; (b) indicate for the record the matter noticed; and (c) indicate the source of his
information." N.J.R. EVID. 11 (1976).
220. See Kongsgaard, Judicial Notice and the California Evidence Code, 18 HASTINGS
L.J. 117, 135-36 (1966).
221. Ehrhardt, A Look at Florida'sProposed Code of Evidence, 2 FLA. STATE U.L. REV.
681 (1974).
222. NEV. REV. STAT. §§74.130-.170 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§20-4-101 to -1102 (Supp.
1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. §901-11 (1975).
223. The three states are Maine, Nebraska, and North Dakota. Ehrhardt, supra note 221,
at 681 n.7.
224. N.M. STAT. ANN. §20-4-201 (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. §902.01(7) (1975). The
Nevada code contains no provision for jury instructions.
225. NEv. REV. STAT. §47.130 (1973).
226. See, e.g., Macht v. Hecht, 191 Md. 98, 102, 59 A.2d 754, 756 (1948).
227. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 201(b), (g).
228. This phenomenon occurs in all areas of the law. For example, the recent revision
of Florida's probate law was stimulated in part by the promulgation of the Uniform
Probate Code. Although a committee studying the revision "approved in principle the
UPC," the Florida Probate Code as subsequently enacted derived 61 out of 185 sections
from the UPC, some with substantial changes. Fenn & Koren, The 1974 Florida Probate Code
Marriage of Convenience. 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1974).
-A
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might adopt the indisputability standard of Rule 201(b) but fail to implement the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts mandated by
subdivision (a). The difficulties that arise when a state changes existing
judicial practices by partially adopting a federal model is illustrated by
recent developments in Florida.
: There are only four Florida cases pertaining to the effect of judicial notice.
In two early cases, one concerning a legislative journal 229 and the other dealing
with a record of extradition,230 the Florida supreme court expressed the view
that matters judicially noticed were conclusive and that any contradictory
23 1
evidence was properly rejected.
In 1953, however, the supreme court took the opposite view in Makos v.
Prince.232 In Makos a county resolution that set different hours of sale of
alcoholic beverages for one part of the county was challenged by liquor dealers
as arbitrary and discriminatory. The trial judge took judicial notice that the
area in question was socially and economically different from the rest of the
county and found the classification reasonable. The plaintiffs were subsequently denied a rehearing in which they offered to contradict the noticed
facts. Holding that the plaintiffs should have been permitted to dispute the
noticed facts, 2 33 the Florida supreme court accepted the Wigmore approach
to the indisputability controversy.
The Makos court made no reference to the distinction between adjudicative
and legislative facts, although such a distinction would have been valid. The
two earlier cases were dearly examples of adjudicative facts. In contrast, the
facts noticed in Makos were legislative because they were used- to determine
the validity of the resolution and hinged on social and economic conditions. 234
Instead, the court distinguished the two prior cases on the narrow grounds that
they involved official records as opposed to matters of common knowledge.235
That the rule was intended to be applied to both adjudicative and legislative
facts is supported by a later district court decision 236 in which judicial notice
was taken of the nonnavigability of a creek, an adjudicative fact. The
district court relied on Makos to determine that a party should have been
afforded an opportunity to challenge the 'noticed fact.237
A codification of Florida's evidence law formulated by the Florida Law
Revision Council238 was recently enacted by the Florida legislature. The

229. State v. Thompson, 121 Fla. 561, 164 So. 192 (1935).
230. Schriver v. Tucker, 42 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1949).
231. State v. Thompson, 121 Fla. 561, 572, 164 So. 192, 197 (1935) (concurring opinion)
("Judicial notice not only supplies the want of evidence to establish the fact judicially
noticed, but necessarily precludes all attempts to proffer contradictory evidence to refute
what the court holds that it must judicially know...
232. 64 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1953).
233. Id. at 673.
234. See C. McCoRmicK, supranote 2, § §328, 331.
235. 64 So. 2d at 673.
236. Nielsen v. Carney Groves, Inc., 159 So. 2d 489 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1964).
237. Id. at 491.
238. FLORIDA LAW REvISION COUNCIL, PRELIMINARY WORKING DRAFr - EvmNCE CODEJuDiCIAL NO'rcE (1973).
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proposed rule on judicial notice 239 illustrates one of the problems created
when a state partially adopts a federal rule but substitutes its own provisions
for the rejected federal portions.
Federal Rule 201 limits the taking of judicial notice to indisputable facts.
Only adjudicative facts come within its regulation, leaving legislative
facts to be noticed in accordance with existing case law. Like Rule 201, the
Florida rule requires indisputability for facts judicially noticed. 40 In addition,
breaking with existing case law, the rule prohibits the introduction of evidence
to dispute judicially noticed facts, the judge being required to instruct the
jury to accept as a fact any matter judicially noticed.2 41 However, unlike
Federal Rule 201, the Florida rule fails to distinguish between adjudicative
and legislative facts.
Since legislative facts are largely disputable, the requirement of indisputability essentially eliminates their judicial notice. As it now stands, the
Florida rule leaves a judge with two equally untenable alternatives. He may
judicially notice disputable legislative facts without specifically acknowledging that he has done so. This solution, however, not only would deprive the
parties of any procedural safeguards but also would discourage candor in
opinion writing. Alternatively, a judge may refrain from judicial notice of
disputable legislative facts; however, the failure to notice legislative facts
2 42
would severely limit the judicial reasoning process.
To avoid severely limiting judicial notice of legislative facts, the Florida
rule should be amended to provide separate treatment of legislative facts.
Another possible alternative would be to follow the federal rule in limiting
the scope of codification to adjudicative facts. Under this approach, judicial
notice of legislative facts would be governed by existing case law, which does
not require indisputability.
Thus, recent case law, evidence codes, and proposed codifications indicate
that Rule 201 will have a significant impact on state evidence law of judicial
notice. In looking to the federal rule for guidance, however, the states
should be aware of the interrelating aspects of the various subdivisions of
the federal rule, taking care not to defeat the purpose of one subdivision by
excluding or modifying another. If Rule 201 receives favorable recognition in
future application in the federal courts, many states may adopt the rule verbatim. This would be a significant step toward uniformity of state evidence
law.
CONCLUSION

Rule 201 should expand the role of judicial notice in the federal judicial
239. PROP. FLA. R. EviD. 90.201-.207.
240. PROP. FLA. R. EvID. 90.202.
241. PROP. FLA. R. EVID. 90.206.
242. One commentator has suggested that application of the indisputable standard
to legislative facts "would create a rule impossible of administration and, if literally applied,
totally destructive of our judicial system. The approach . . . shows a basic misconception
of the judicial function and a simplistic belief that nothing even resembling a legislative
function should be tolerated on the part of a court." Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 125, 162-63.
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